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THE DIFFIDENCE OF POWER- 
SOME NOTES AND REFLECTIONS ON 
THE AMERICAN ROAD TO MUNICH 
by Francis L. Loewenheim 
In June 1972, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared before 
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives for the first time since 
leaving office in January 1969. Addressing himself to the problem of 
"national security and the changing world power alignment," Secretary 
Rusk-now Sibley Professor of International Law at the University of 
Georgia-remarked: "I have pointed out to some of my young friends, 
as I visited many campuses in the last year or two, that they would not 
necessarily improve their position if they reject the mistakes of their 
fathers merely to embrace the mistakes of their grandfathers."' The Sub- 
committee listened attentively, and even its more dovish members 
seemed, for the moment at least, disinclined to press Professor Rusk on 
his position. 
The former Secretary of State may well have been somewhat surprised 
by his friendly reception, for liberal orthodoxy-which had long ago 
gained control of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had in 
recent years made a number of converts on the House Committee-has 
long maintained that there was no significant connection, or even reason- 
able similarity, between the events of the 1930's which reached a climax 
at Munich in September 1938 and the events of the 1950's and 1960's 
which reached a climax in the bitter and protracted Vietnam war. 
It is only fair to note that this particular position has been adopted 
not only by some American journalists or historians whose knowledge of 
the European past understandably may be somewhat limited, but also by 
a number of well-known historians of modern Europe, one of whom 
(Fritz Stern, Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University) has 
recently written that "advocates of the Vietnamese war have for years 
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deluded themselves and others by invoking Munich as the failure of 
appeasement to justify their persistent error. Out of respect for the dead, we 
should adopt a moratorium on faciIe analogies with unique suffering; the 
memory of that past should not be dissipated by mindless invectives."= 
Judging from such impassioned remarks as these, there can be little doubt 
that the possible resemblance of the eras of Munich and Vietnam has be- 
come a highly controversial subject. Considering the importance of the sub- 
ject, both from a historical and political standpoint, and in view of the fact 
that historians both in Europe and in the United States have, in recent years, 
devoted increasing attention to problems of Atlantic and comparative histo- 
ry, it seems rather surprising that apparently there have been no previous 
studies of this subject. 
What follows is, for a number of reasons, not intended as a comparison 
of the Vietnam situation and the Munich crisis as such. In the first place, 
although Professor Stern does not say so, no reputable scholar or statesman 
has contended that one could, strictly speaking, compare a conflict that has 
lasted since the mid-1940's with a crisis that took place between April and 
October 1938. What supporters of resistance to Communist subversion and 
aggression in Southeast Asia have in fact maintained is that there appears 
to them to be a disturbing resemblance between such subversion and aggres- 
sion and corresponding developments in the 1930's-developments to which 
the Western democracies, the United States included, responded largely by 
a policy of appea~ement.~ Supporters of American policy in Southeast Asia 
(and elsewhere) have further contended that there is, in essence, no differ- 
ence between subversion and aggression whether carried out in Europe, 
Africa, or Asia, and no difference whether inspired, directed, and carried out 
by totalitarians of the right or left.4 
In the second place, it seems clear that much of the discussion of possible 
similarities and differences between the Munich and Vietnam eras has 
proved largely pointless because it has been beset by a remarkable lack of 
knowledge and understanding of the Munich era, and especially of Ameri- 
can policy during this period5 -a policy which played a far greater and more 
important role during those years than is generally recognized. The principal 
purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine, as a preface to a study of the 
larger problem, especially in the light of recently published evidence, the 
development of American diplomacy in the Munich era, with special ref- 
erence to its response to the spread of aggression in the 1930's. 
This is not to suggest that the course of American diplomacy in the 1930's 
has not been profitably examined before, notably in James MacGregor 
Burns's The Lion and the  FOX,^ the superb first volume of his outstanding 
Roosevelt biography; in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason's The 
Challenge to Isolation 1937-1940,' the no less superb first volume of their 
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excellent two-volume history The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy; 
in William E. Leuchtenburg's Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932- 
1940,~ the best single-volume history of the subject; and in Manfred Jonas's 
lsolationism in American 1935-1941,9 an impressive synthesis of intellectual 
and political history. The following pages generally agree with all of these 
interpretations of Rooseveltian and American foreign policy from 1933 to 
1938. Nevertheless, this is a subject of such significance (both in its own right 
and because of its possible implications for our own time) that it has seemed 
appropriate to take another, closer, look at the subject with special attention 
to the role of President Roosevelt, his leading advisers and diplomats, and 
the most recent evidence concerning their views and policies. 
No attempt has been made to provide in the following pages a comprehen- 
sive account of American foreign policy in the Munich era, which would 
have added substantially to the length of the present paper, but it is hoped 
that no important aspect of the subject has been left entirely neglected, and 
that the problems that have been singled out for more detailed discussion 
will appear to the reader to warrant such treatment. 
A word, finally, should be said about the methodology of this account. In 
the pages that follow, an effort has been made to inform the reader not only 
about what is now known concerning the important men, problems, and 
ideas of the Munich era, especially from the standpoint of the United States, 
but also something about how and when this information became publicly 
available. Furthermore, because much of the material discussed below is to 
be found in government and other publications not widely available, and 
also because the subject lends itself to this treatment, it has seemed best to 
permit the evidence, where possible, to speak for itself. If this approach has 
resulted in a wealth of direct quotations from the record, it may also convey 
a greater sense of immediacy to the reader. 
In the debate about American foreign policy that has been raging for more 
than twenty years-a debate that began with the publication, in September 
1951, of George F. Kennan's American Diplomacy 1900-195010 -much has 
been written about America's "arrogance of power,"I1 about an alleged "Pax 
Americana,"12 about America's supposed assumption of the role of "police- 
man of the world,"and so on. 
This is not the appropriate place to discuss the remarkable historical 
judgments of Chairman Fulbright of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the United States Senate or those of his many influential supporters and 
admirers, although it may be observed in passing that one of the common 
characteristics of much recent criticism of postwar American foreign policy, 
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especially on the part of New Left historians, has been its largely, if not 
entirely, unhistorical character.l3 Much of this "revisionist" criticism has, 
among other shortcomings, exhibited a lamentable inability to explain how 
and why the United States found itself, twenty years after the second world 
war, both in Europe and Asia, in the position so well described by John F. 
Kennedy at the close of the address he planned to deliver in Dallas on 
November 22, 1963: "We in this country, in this generation are-by destiny 
rather than by choice-the watchmen on the walls of f reed~m," '~  or as 
President Johnson eloquently put it a t  his press conference of July 28, 1965: 
"We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else."Is 
The President went on to ask at that press conference-one of the most 
important and impressive of a11 his years in the White House: 
Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and with golden promise, 
toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place [Vietnam]? 
The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one, but it echoes clearly from the painful 
lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two World Wars and Korea, 
Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at  a terrible and 
a brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace. . . . 
Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring eeace, because we learned from Hitler at 
Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed 
in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler 
conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.16 
The President was not, on that occasion, telling the country something that 
it had not heard before. Every President since the second world war had felt 
the same way. In his memoirs, President Truman-an avid and close student 
of history who had long believed "that almost all current events in the affairs 
of governments and nations have their parallels and precedents in the past"17 
-recalled his flight from Kansas City back to Washington on the afternoon 
of June 25, 1950, after receiving word of the Communist attack on South 
Korea: 
I had time to think aboard the plane. In my generation, this was not the first occasion when 
the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, 
Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged 
the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, 
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain 
that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to 
override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their 
way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation 
would have the courage to resist threats and aggressions by stronger Communist neighbors. 
If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar 
incidents had brought on the second world war.'' 
President Eisenhower, who remembered the rampant "anti-militarism" 
and isolationism of the interwar years when he was a rising young staff 
officer in the United States Army, recalled the lessons of the 1930's in a letter 
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to Prime Minister Churchill written at the height of the Indochina crisis of 
1954: 
~f [the French] do not see it through and Indochina passes into the hands of the Commu- 
nists the ultimate effect on our and your strategic position with the consequent shift in the 
power ratios throughout Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable 
to you and me. . . . If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hlrohito, Mussolini 
and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years 
of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something 
from that lesson.19 
President Johnson's immediate predecessor-many of whose close friends 
and associates were later venomously to attack Johnson for continuing the 
policies that John F. Kennedy had followed in Southeast Asia-also believed 
in the relevance of past to present, and especialIy the meaning of the 1930's 
for our own times. 
John Kennedy had learned about appeasement at first hand as a young 
man. At the end of 1937 his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, had been appointed 
American ambassador to Great Britain. In the winter and spring of 1939, 
that is, in the interval between Munich and Hitler's takeover of what re- 
mained of Czechoslovakia after Munich, young Kennedy, then a junior at 
Harvard, had travelled extensively throughout Europe.2o In Why England 
Slept, a revision of his senior thesis entitled Appeasement at Munich, complet- 
ed in the spring of 1940, Kennedy had written: "We withdrew from Europe 
in the 1920's and refused to do anything to preserve the democracy we had 
helped to save. We thought that it made no difference to us what happened 
in Europe. We are beginning to realize that it does,"21 As President of the 
United States, Kennedy returned to this theme in a nationwide television 
address he delivered at the height of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. 
"The 1930's," Kennedy said on that occasion, "taught us a clear lesson: 
aggressive conduct, if alIowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately 
leads to war."22 
It remained, however, for a leading English historian, A. L. Rowse, to put 
his finger on the role of the United States in the coming of the second world 
war. "The fundamental reason for the Second World War," he wrote in 
Appeasement-A Study in Political De~line,~3 his brilliant memoir of All Souls 
College in the 1930's, "was the withdrawal of America out of the world 
system: that, more than anything, enabled the aggressors to get away with 
things. Not all the mistakes this country [Great Britain] was responsible for 
in the 1920's and 1930's equalled the one enormous and irreparable mistake 
America made in contracting out of re~ponsibility."~~ 
If the remarks quoted above seem to have made little permanent impres- 
sion, the reason may well be that by the 1960's most Americans remembered 
little, and probably cared less, about their country's foreign policy in the 
Munich era. It may also have been true that such indifference was partly the 
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result of the fact that the full story of American diplomacy in the 1930's was 
a long time becoming known. It  seems likely that many Americans who had 
lived through that period, or had read about it at one time or another, 
recalled something of the isolationist climate of the time and the country's 
determination (expressed, for instance, in a series of so-called neutrality acts) 
never again to become involved in a foreign war unless the United States was 
first attacked; but they probably recalled little or nothing, for instance, about 
the attitude and policies of President Roosevelt. During the postwar years 
Roosevelt was largely remembered as having sought to alert the country to 
the dangers lurking abroad, as having done what he could to assist Britain 
in her "finest hour," and accordingly as deserving to be ranked with Church- 
ill as one of the handful of men who had saved western democracy.25 
I t  is not necessary at this point to inquire how Roosevelt had acquired this 
largely undeserved reputation. A recent survey of historical writing on twen- 
tieth-century American foreign policy offers the plausible explanation that 
"in the past diplomatic historians . . . assumed that throughout the thirties 
Roosevelt remained a Wilsonian, committed to the concept of collective 
security, and, that, though he reconciled himself to the isolationist mood of 
the era, he never accepted its  assumption^."^^ It would probably be more 
accurate to say, however, that until the publication of Langer and Gleason's 
fine volumes on American diplomacy 1937-1941, which appeared in the early 
1950's, most American historians tended to skirt the subject of Rooseveltian 
diplomacy in the Munich era, in part perhaps because, many of them being 
liberal partisans, it was a rather painful subject they preferred to touch on 
as lightly as po~sible.~' 
Indeed, one main reason why there has been so much apparent confusion 
or indifference concerning the possible resemblance of the Munich and 
Vietnam eras is the fact that, for more than twenty years (from the time that 
the inner history of American foreign policy in the 1930's first began to be 
fully known in the 1950's, untiI the present), most leading and widely 
used books on recent American history have in effect failed to tell the full 
story of American diplomacy in the Munich era. The story they have told- 
about rampant isolationist feeling, about the passage of "neutrality acts" and 
the like-was true enough as far as it went. The problem was that, almost 
without exception, these books did not go far enough. In particular, they 
failed to make clear how well informed President Roosevelt and the State 
Department were about what was happening abroad at the time-whether 
in Europe, Africa, or the Far East-and how inadequately they responded 
to that information. These books also failed to make clear how Roosevelt 
and his administration became, in effect, the prisoners of certain gross histor- 
ical misjudgments, and who was responsible for propagating and disseminat- 
ing these mi~judgments.~~ 
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Sometimes even the best and most highly respected books on this period 
went completely astray, as for instance when Morison and Commager, in the 
fourth edition of their Growth of the American Republic, published in 1950, 
asserted that Roosevelt had "disapproved" the neutrality act of 1937,29 citing 
as their evidence a statement Roosevelt made in July 1941. They convenient- 
ly overlooked the fact that, at his famous four hundredth news conference, 
held on October 6, 1937, Roosevelt had chided the distinguished Washington 
reporter Ernest K. Lindley for suggesting that the neutrality legislation then 
in effect conflicted with the substance of the "Quarantine Speech" he had 
delivered the day before in Chicagoe30 It was not until the sixth edition, 
pblished in 1969, that Morison and Commager-now joined by William E. 
Leuchtenburg, the expert author of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 
1932-1940, who had the "main authority" for revision of the Morison and 
Commager volume-admitted that "when President Roosevelt signed the 
Neutrality Act of 1937, he seemed to be endorsing all the assumptions of the 
isolati~nists."~~ 
It may be that even had the American people, in the late 1960's and early 
1970's, been fully and accurately informed about the course and significance 
of American diplomacy in the 1930's, their response to the challenge of 
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia might ultimately have been much 
the same. Such considerations, however, are no part of the historian's busi- 
ness. His task is to make sure that the story of the past, distant and more 
recent, is fully known, and properly understood, by the general public as well 
as by other scholars. The rest is up to them. 
To understand the differences and similarities between the Munich and 
Vietnam eras, we must therefore take a closer look at  the 1930's to see how 
the United States, and President Roosevelt in particular, responded to the 
spread of aggression in Europe, Africa, and Asia, and how the story of that 
response itself became known to the interested public. 
The American public received, or should have received, its first cIose look 
at American foreign policy in the Munich era from the personal papers of 
the American ambassador to Germany from 1933-1937, Professor William 
E. Dodd, which were edited and published by his son and daughter a year 
after his death in February 1940.32 
Dodd, who had been professor of history at the University of Chicago 
since 1908, was one of the outstanding scholars, teachers, and members of 
the historical profession in this century. He served as President of the Ameri- 
can Historical Association in 1934 and returned from Berlin in December 
of that year to deliver his presidential address. A dedicated Jeffersonian, 
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Dodd was passionately devoted also to the ideals of Woodrow Wilson, and 
was convinced that the world crisis of the interwar years was largely the 
result of the frustration and ultimate defeat of Wilson's principles and objec- 
tives at the end of the Great War. Dodd, moreover, was no stranger to 
German history, politics, and culture. He had studied in Germany in the late 
1890's and received his doctorate from the University of Leipzig in 1900, his 
thesis director being Erich Marcks, subsequently the biographer of Bis- 
marck. 
It is sometimes forgotten, especially after the appearance of the pertinent 
government documents and other evidence, how much certain books pub- 
lished at an earlier date revealed about particular periods. Ambassador 
Dodd's Diary 1933-1938 was such a book. It was a volume about which 
Charles A. Beard-with whose later views of international affairs Dodd, as 
will be seen, frequently disagreed33 -wrote appropriately that "when the 
record of our troubled age is written, in distant years to come, this journal 
will be regarded as a priceless source of primary information and a vibrant 
human document illustrating American character in this period."14 Dodd's 
book also provided a fascinating view of political developments, economic 
and social conditions, and intellectual Iife in Nazi Germany. It was from 
Dodd's diary that the public first received, among other things, an inside 
account of President Roosevelt's grandiose peace plans before Munich- 
plans for which Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles subsequently 
claimed credit and which in the end, not surprisingly under the circum- 
stances, came to nothing.35 
While not uncritical of the British and French policies which, in his estima- 
tion, had facilitated Hitler's rise to power, Dodd was appalled by the pusil- 
lanimous response of the Western democracies, headed by the United States, 
to the spread of totalitarian aggression, beginning with the Japanese invasion 
of Manchuria in 193 1. Dodd was no less outraged by the efforts of giant Ameri- 
can corporations-whose names he freely me~ltioned'~-to take advantage of 
the German market and to strike profitable deals with the Nazi regime, and by 
the feckless efforts of some individual Americans-including for instance Ja- 
cob Gould Schurman, United States ambassador to Germany from 1925 to 
19303'-to ingratiate themselves with the German government. 
Dodd's journal shows that he perceived that the struggle between totalitar- 
ianism and democracy was not only one of power but of ideals, and he was 
determined (as witnessed by the numerous speeches he delivered on the 
subject both at his post and while on home leave)38 that the democracies 
should give no intellectual quarter to their adversaries. For instance, Dodd 
was strongly opposed to American officials lending their presence to the 
annual Nazi congresses at Nuremberg, and while back in the United States 
in August 1937 sent Secretary of State Hull a confidential letter "advising 
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against attendance at the Nuremberg party show by Prentiss Gilbert, now 
our Chargi: d'Affaires in Berlin."39 After Gilbert had proceeded there any- 
how, Dodd sent Hull a telegram "protesting strongly against this violation 
of our 150-year-old diplomatic custom of not attending party celebrations 
in foreign c o ~ n t r i e s , " ~ ~  parts of which letter and telegram soon appeared in 
the Republican New York Herald Tribune. As Hajo Holborn pointed out, 
''Dodd did not fall in with the desire of many of his contemporaries to come 
to terms with anyone who happened to be the ruler of the day. . . . His 
disillusionment was considerable when he began to see that most professors 
[at the University of Berlin] seemed to acquiesce in their own intimidation. 
His diary draws a sad picture of a procession of neo-Nazis of all creeds 
swarming around him, eager to explain the degree of their submission to 
Nazi di~tation."~' 
Almost alone among the leading intellectual and diplomatic figures of the 
period, Dodd understood that there was a direct connection between the 
spread of aggression in Europe, Africa, and the Far East, just as he had 
sought to warn his contemporaries ever since the end of the Great War that 
the western democracies could no longer stand up to the totalitarian powers 
without American assistance. 
As Professor Julius Pratt first pointed Dodd cabled Secretary Hull 
as early as April 5, 1935, that the 
present European situation is parallel to that of 1912. The Hltler triumvirate is however 
far more powerful than the Kalser was. The Reichswehr 1s not as ready now as the old army 
leaders were but grievances and ambitions of the Nazl forces are much deeper. . . . You 
may infer from these facts that war is the direct and major aim. Nearly all Germans swear 
that Germany did not precipitate the great war but they declare with equal equanimity that 
the United States prevented them from dominating Europe in 1918. Since American 
intervention will not be repeated the Third Relch will a t  strategic moment seize the 
[Polish] Corridor or Austria and if war follows win what was lost In 1918."~ 
Twenty-eight months later the situation had deteriorated further. "The 
situation in Europe is such," Dodd wrote Roosevelt in a grand exposition 
of his views in August 1937, 
that Amencan action as to the Far East tyranny In conjunction with England would not 
start Germany into her war scheme.. . .Therefore, I would, in your position, press conserv- 
ative England (the Government) tojoln us in pressure upon Japan, even to send American- 
British navies across the Pacific. Later Germany and Italy would act together if thls were 
done-now they would not move.. . . Russia 1s in such a critical situation at home that 
she can't act to save China alone.. . . So, it seems to me just now our Government, England 
and France with the Holland Navy in the Far East, can ask cooperation of Russia and save 
the situation. Certainly if this dictatorla1 system goes on two more years unchecked, as in 
Ethiopia, Spain and now China, a combination of democratic . . . states may not save 
themselves. I am taking the liberty to write you because I know we have the same ideals 
and because I have watched and studied things in Berlin four sad years. All representatives 
of democratic countries in Berlin have again and again said: the United States 1s the only 
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nation that can save our c iv i l i~at ion.~~ 
Charles A. Beard summed up Dodd's achievement: 
[Dodd] saw more clearly than most of his colleagues, American arid foreign, in the dip- 
lomatic corps, the hard drift of things toward the tragedy of the comlng years. He repeated- 
ly predicted, despite the eplthets "alarmist" and "sensationalist" applied to him by un- 
friendly critics, the ruthless course wh~ch Germany, Italy, and Japan were dest~ned to take, 
if unchecked by the concerted act~on of their neighbors. He divined the frightful crash 
bound ro come from the policy of appeasement, intrigue, and vaclllatlon, and he fought 
relentlessly, as far as he was able, to stop it?' 
Those efforts, it is now clear, made Dodd no friends in high places in 
Washington. In his memoirs, Secretary Hull described Dodd as "sincere 
though impulsive and inexperienced."46 Indeed,Dodd became highly unpop- 
ular with many of the Department's powerful career officials and political 
appointees including Sumner W e l l e ~ ~ ~  and William C. BulIitt who, in Decem- 
ber 1936, while serving as American ambassador to France, wrote to Roose- 
velt that "Dodd has many admirable and likeable qualities, but he is almost 
ideally ill-equipped for his present job. He hates the Nazis too much to be 
able to do anything or get anything out of them."48 All of this, together with 
the Nazi regime's increasingly insistent demands for his rem0va1,~~ led to his 
somewhat premature recall at the end of 1937, and his replacement by the 
colorless, undistinguished, and ineffective Hugh Wilson. Returning to the 
United States in January 1938, Dodd embarked on a series of lecture tours 
designed to alert the American people to the growing threat abroad, arguing, 
as he had throughout his service in Berlin, that the threat to peace and 
freedom was not only European but worldwide in scope. "When China and 
Japan, Germany, Italy, and . . . the Danube zone, all come into co-opera- 
tion, I cannot help thinking democracy everywhere will be in grave dan- 
ger-"50 
- 
Dodd's account included virtually no direct or indirect criticism of 
Roosevelt's foreign policy, although he remarked rather caustically in No- 
vember 1937 on the social ostentatiousness of Sumner Welles, newly ap- 
pointed Under Secretary of State. Dodd noted that he "was a little surprised 
to read a day or two ago in the press that Roosevelt had spent a Sunday with 
Welles at his Maryland mansion. Politics is a strange game, even with a real 
man like Roo~evelt. ' '~~ I t  is difficult to believe, however, that Dodd was 
satisfied with the President's largely passive approach to foreign affairs, 
especially during his first four years in office, about which Roosevelt re- 
marked at a Jackson Day dinner in January 1936: "A Government can be 
no better than the public opinion which sustains it."5Z 
With Woodrow Wilson's example still fresh in Dodd's mind, Roosevelt's 
position could hardly have been the Ambassador's model of courageous and 
effective leadership. On the other hand, Dodd was not unmindful either of 
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the political and intellectual constraints on Roosevelt's leadership in the 
realm of foreign affairs. After a meeting with Colonel House in January 
1935, he wrote dejectedly that it was doubtful "whether President Roose- 
velt or any other President of our time would venture such an unpopular 
move [sending an ambassador to Geneva as the first step toward Ameri- 
can membership in the League of Nations] with the masses who have 
been propagandized for fourteen years against any connection or co- 
operation anywhere."53 Roosevelt, Dodd believed, "must act this year or 
surrender in matters of American relations to distraught Europe." 
Two weeks later, after the Senate had defeated Rooseveltas proposal 
that the United States join the World Court, Dodd thought of resigning 
his post "in protest against Senate minority domination of American 
foreign policy. It would create a sensation but it would give me the 
chance to say to the people how foolish it seemed to me for our people 
to denounce minority dictatorships in Europe and then allow a minority 
of men, largely under Hearst and Coughlin influence, to rule the United 
States in such an important matter.'jS4 
In the end, however, Dodd was dissuaded from such action both by 
Under Secretary of State R. Walton Moore-who, according to Dodd, 
wondered nevertheless "whether Roosevelt had really made up his mind 
as to the importance of better world relationsm-and by Secretary Hull, 
whom Dodd quoted as saying: "I hope you won't resign even if you can 
do nothing now in Berlin. We also are helpless. All peoples are economi- 
cally crazy, and our people are being misled all the time."55 
In the event, Dodd was spared the experience of observing Hitler's 
annexation of Austria and the Munich crisis from the vantage point of 
the German capital. But he was not surprised by these developments. 
"Hitler," he said at the time of Munich, "would not have risked war if 
the democracies had been united against him over the Czech que~ t ion . "~~  
When it was first published in March 1941, Ambassador Dodd's Diary 
received a cordial public and critical reception, and Dodd-who had 
long made a practice of keeping careful track of the sales of his books- 
would have been pleased had he lived to see those of his Berlin account. 
In a sense, however, Dodd's volume appeared at a rather inopportune 
time. For by early 1941 world events had persuaded a substantial, per- 
haps an overwhelming, majority of Americans that Hitler and Hirohito 
were indeed a direct menace to the United States. For all their wealth 
of detail and instructive insights, it seems doubtful if Dodd's perceptive 
observations and conclusions exerted a significant influence on American 
opinion immediately before and during the war, any more than his splen- 
did personal letters to the President-a few of which were first published 
in some of the State Department's documentary volumes Foreign Rela- 
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tions of the United States in the 1950's-exerted a demonstrable effect on 
Roosevelt's thinking and policy in the crucial months and years before 
Munich. 
In any case, it seems clear that Dodd's vision of America's global respon- 
sibility in the Munich era was not widely shared at that time. One outstand- 
ing American statesman who felt much the same as Dodd was Henry L. 
Stimson, who had served as Secretary of War under William Howard Taft 
and as Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover. In his memoirs, On Active 
Service in Peace and War, written in collaboration with McGeorge Bundy 
(then a Junior Fellow at Harvard University) and published in April 1948- 
one of the great books on modern American political and diplomatic histo- 
ry-Stimson recalled that he had left office in March 1933 with a sense of 
moderate optimism, and he admitted that he had "greatly underestimated 
the Nazis during their first three years in power."57 
Like Dodd, Stimson was well aware of the prevailing climate of ideas that 
exerted such an unfortunate effect on the nation's foreign policy in the 
Munich era. "In the early 1930's," Stimson recalled, "many Americans were 
persuaded by a new school of writers that in 1917 they had gone to war not 
because of unrestricted submarine warfare, and st i l  less because Imperial 
Germany threatened the world's freedom, but because of the munitions 
makers, the bankers, and the sly propagandists of England and France. In 
these years still more Americans became convinced by the same writers that, 
whatever the reason for American participation in the First World War, it 
had been a ghastly mistake."S8 
Such sentiments anesthetized public opinion and paralyzed official policy. 
As he recalled in his memoirs, in 193 1 and I932 
the diplomacy of America was, in all conscience, quite sufficiently hamstrung by American 
 sola at ion ism. In the years from 1935 to 1939 Stimson was forced to watch a demonstration 
of still greater and more damaging folly.. . . Stimson watched the course of events, from 
the betrayal of Ethiopla through the absurd "non-~ntervention" in Spain, on to the final 
moral abdlcat~on at Munich, in mounting apprehension and dismay, but he spoke no word 
of these views in public; he agreed wlth a friend in October 1938, "in feeling (as Americans 
whose country would not help out in the situation) a great disinclination to criticize those 
who had the responsibility."59 
This is not to say, however, that Stimson had remained silent as regards 
the spread of aggression and the menace it posed to the United States. Like 
Dodd, Stimson believed that there was no difference between aggression in 
Europe, Africa, and the Far East, and failure to deal effectively with aggres- 
sion in one part of the world only encouraged it in another. As Stimson put 
it bluntly in his famous letter to The New York Times, a document running 
to several thousand words, written before Roosevelt's '"Quarantine Speech," 
but not published until two days after that address on October 7, 1937: 
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Americans [Stimson's letter, which occupied the better part of a full page of The New York 
Times, began] are shocked and outraged at what is taking place in the Far East. But to many 
of them it presents merely a confused picture of distant horrors with which they think we 
have no necessary connection and to which they can close their eyes and turn their backs 
in the belief that we owe no duty to the situation except to keep out of it and forget tt. 
The Western democracies, Stimson believed, had a real and direct respon- 
sibility for what was happening in the Far East. 
The lamentable fact is that today the aggression of Japan is being actively asslsted by the 
efforts of men of our own nation and men of the other great democracy in the world-the 
British Commonwealth of Nations. It is not only being actively assisted, but our assistance 
is so effective and predominant that wlthout it even today the aggression would In all 
probability be promptly checked and cease.. . . China's pnncipal need is not that some- 
thing should be done by outside nations to help her, but that outside nations should cease 
helping her enemy. 
With that Stimson got down to more specific questions and recommenda- 
tions. 
In the light of [the above facts], the first question that I should ask of the American and 
British peoples is this: Does the safety of the American natlon and the safety of the British 
Empire require that we go on helping Japan to exterminate, by the methods she is daily 
employing, the gallant Chinese soldiers with which she is confronted-not to speak of the 
civilian Chinese population that she is engaged in terrorizing? Is the condition of our 
statesmanship so pitifully inadequate that we cannot devise the simple means of tnterna- 
tional cooperation which would stop our participation in this slaughter? I for one do not 
think so. I believe it can be done effectively without serious danger to us.60 
Stimson was not unaware of the isolationist mood of the Congress, and he 
realized that he was in no position to alter that mood significantly, He 
believed, however, that the President had an  obligation to provide moral 
leadership and that he had not done so. "The only person who can effectively 
rouse and marshal moral opinion is the President of the United States and 
when he tries to do so I have no doubt of his eventual success,"61 he had said 
in a radio address over the Columbia Broadcasting System in October 1935, 
after Congress had passed, and Roosevelt had approved without serious 
objection, a so-called "neutrality act" providing for a mandatory ban on 
exports to all declared belligerents. "The President," Stimson recalled later 
with some bitterness, "had done little or nothing to head off this legislative 
folly which would discourage the victims of aggression and not its perpetra- 
tors, in the present instance Italy making war on Ethiopia." As Stimson 
pointed out, "not a word had been said by the administration as to the issues 
here involved-the moral issue between an aggressor and its victim, the 
political issue between collective security and international anarchy. Here 
Stimson saw a clear duty of leadership; he believed that if the President made 
his appeal on basic moral and political grounds he would be able to enforce 
a general voluntary trade embargo against Italy."62 
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This was the position to which Stimson returned in his letter to The New 
York Times in October 1937 quoted above. Accepting the fact that American 
military intervention in Asia was at that time probably militarily impossible 
and doubtless "abhorrent to our people," the United States, Stimson was 
convinced, was not bound to "a passive and shameful acquiescence in the 
wrong that is now being done" by Japan to China, and he strongly urged 
the imposition of a complete trade embargo against Japan. 
Our recent neutrality legislation [Stimson wrote] attempts to impose a dead level of neutral 
conduct on the part of our Government between right and wrong, between atl aggressor 
and its victim.. . . It won't work. Such a policy of amoral drift by such a safe and powerful 
nation as our own will only set back the hands of progress. It will not save us from 
entanglement. It will even make entanglement more certain. History has already amply 
shown this last fact.63 
As already noted, Stimson's letter hadbeen prepared before Roosevelt deliv- 
ered his "Quarantine Speech," but after Iearning of the President's remarks 
Stimson added a new ending: "Since the writing of the foregoing letter," he 
concluded, "has come the President's Chicago speech. I am filled with hope 
that this act of leadership on his part will result in a new birth of American 
courage in facing and carrying through our responsibility in this crisis."64 
Unfortunately, Stimson's hopes soon proved unfounded. To be sure, in his 
"Quarantine Speech" the President seemed to be abandoning at last the 
largely neutralist stance he had followed since taking office, but when he 
concluded from the response to his address-mistakenly as is now know@ 
-that the country was not prepared for such a departure, he quickly denied 
that any significant change in policy had ever been intended in the first 
place.66 
As Stimson wrote later, the climax of "the legislative peacemaking of the 
ostrich era" was the attempt at the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938 
to enact the so-called "Ludlow Resolution," named after Democratic Con- 
gressman from Indiana Louis Ludlow, which provided that, except in case 
of direct enemy attack, any declaration of war by the United States had to 
be approved by a national referendum. For Stimson this proposal-which 
on the face of it resembles similar proposals bandied about or actually 
introduced in the Congress in the recent stages of the Vietnam conflict-was 
"the high point in the prewar self-deception of the American people."67 
Stimson saw this proposal as "a first blow at the authority and discretion 
of the Government in foreign affairs." It seemed to him that "it would 
certainly strike an aggressor and potential aggressor as a further demon- 
stration that American foreign policy was in the end dependent on a political 
campaign"; and he published a devastating critique of the proposal in a long 
letter to The New York Times on December 21, 1937.68 
Although Stimson did not mention it in his memoirs, it should be pointed 
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out that, with one or two notable exceptions, the Ludlow Resolution enjoyed 
the vigorous, indeed overwhelming, support of liberal journals of opinion69 
and members of Congress, including many who had been swept into office 
by the Roosevelt landslide of 1936.70 It should further be recalled that both 
~oosevelt  and Hull long delayed coming to grips with the proposal, and that 
it was only at the last minute, when there was a serious threat that the LudIow 
~esolution might be taken up and passed by the House of Representatives, 
that Roosevelt sent a letter, drafted by the Department of State, to William 
B. Bankhead, Speaker of the House, opposing the measure." It was de- 
feated - or, to put it more accurately, its discharge from the Rules Comittee 
was defeated- in January 1938 by a vote of 209 to 188, one of those voting 
against taking up the proposal being a young Congressman from Texas, re- 
cently elected to the House, named Lyndon B. Johnson.'* 
It  remains only to be observed that by the early 1970's, Stimson, for all 
his wisdom and foresight, had become, like William E. Dodd, a largely 
neglected and forgotten figure in modern American history. He is the subject 
of an inadequate authorized biography,73 his important papers, including his 
remarkable personal diary, are still unpublished and largely inaccessible, and 
the achievements and significance of his life are largely unknown to those 
for whom they might do the most good. 
Stimson, speaking and writing about the course of American foreign poli- 
cy in the Munich era, was an insider become an outsider, although his old 
personal contacts in Washington no doubt allowed him to continue to be 
well informed. On the other hand, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, who 
served as Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943, were the most inside 
of insiders. They met frequently and regularly with the President. They had 
access to a11 the State Department's voluminous diplomatic reporting. They 
met on a regular basis with all leading ambassadors in Washington. In sum, 
there was nothing about the country's foreign policy that they did not know 
or should not have known. But when they came to tell the country what had 
transpired in the Munich era, they produced-Welles especially-rather 
unsatisfying accounts. 
In July 1944 Sumner Welles published the first of two autobiographical 
volumes. It was entitled The Time for Deci~ion.'~ A year had passed since 
Welles's still unexplained resignation as Under Secretary of State. His book 
did little to enlighten, and much to confuse, the reader about the 1930's. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, the name of Secretary Hull, with whom Welles had 
carried on a long and bitter feud, appeared in the index only once, but 
throughout the early pages of the volume Hull was subjected to scathing, if 
indirect, criticism. Roosevelt and his policies, on the other hand, received, 
with one or two notable exceptions of which mention will be made below, 
fulsome praise. Welles dwelled at length on Roosevelt's supposed peace 
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plans in 1937-1938-this being perhaps the single greatest "revelation" con- 
tained in Welles's volume-for which plans the former Under Secre- 
tary claimed a large share of the credit.75 Although elaborated by Winston 
Churchill in The Gathering Storm, the first volume of his memoirs of the 
second world war,76 and repeated by innumerable historians and other writ- 
ers since that timeY7 Welles's account was substantially inaccurate and mis- 
Ieading and must now be regarded as disproved.78 
Elsewhere in The Time for Decision, Welles asserted that "up till the 
moment of the final crisis, British, as well as French and American, public 
opinion was still greatly influenced by many figures in positions of authority 
who could not understand that Hitler did not care about pacific solutions."79 
Welles did not identify the individuals he had in mind. On other aspects of 
the Munich era, however, Welles showed that he had a highly selective 
memory, and his account of Roosevelt's diplomacy during his first term is 
not only factually seriously flawed (for instance, he cites Roosevelt's foreign 
policy address at Chautauqua as having been given in 1934,*O when it was 
actually delivered in August 1936; and he writes that "in the face of popular 
agitation" a Presidential veto of the revised neutrality legislation of January 
1937 "would not only have been overridden by Congress, but would have 
been misunderstood by the people. The people had not been really enlight- 
ened about the actual issues involved"81), but Welles failed to mention that 
Roosevelt had done little or nothing to discourage the passage of such 
legislation. While Welles's bitter criticism of American policy during the 
so-called Spanish Civil War-"in the long history of the foreign policy of the 
Roosevelt Administration, there has been, I think, no more cardinal error 
than the policy adopted during the civil war in S~ain"8~-may be under- 
standable, a careful study of State Department records turned up no evi- 
dence that Welles made any attempt to change the policy he later so de- 
p10red.~~ 
Nor was Welles's account of American policy during the Munich crisis 
itself any more enlightening or, for that matter, even factually accurate. Thus 
Welles recounted, for instance, Roosevelt's appeals to Hitler of September 
26 and 27, and his appeal to Mussolini on the latter date?4 But Welles 
conveniently overlooked, as will be seen, that in his second message to Hitler 
Roosevelt in effect asked the German dictator only not to take by force what 
he had already gained by diplomatic nego t i a t i~n .~~  Welles strongly suggested 
that Mussolini "urged Hitler by telephone, on the morning of September 28, 
to avoid an outbreak of war and to continue negotiations with the British 
and French governments7' after he had received a message from Roosevelt 
encouraging him in that direction,86 although Welles should have known 
from the cables of the American ambassador in Rome, William Phillips, that 
Roosevelt's message to Mussolini had not been delivered until after Mussoli- 
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ni had urged Hitler to "give peace a chance";87 Welles made no mention of 
the fact-although he surely knew-that Roosevelt, upon learning of 
Chamberlain's dramatic announcement to the House of Commons that 
he was going to Munich the following day, had sent the Prime Minister 
a congratulatory telegram;88 and, finally, Welles curiously forgot to men- 
tion that, three days after the Munich conference, he had delivered a 
nationwide broadcast in the course of which he asserted "today, perhaps 
more than at any time during the past two decades, there is presented 
the opportunity for the establishment by the Nations of the World of a 
new world order based upon justice and upon law."a9 
Welles, in sum, was rewriting history as Roosevelt and his uncritical 
admirers and associates wished it had happened or would like to have 
it remembered as having happened. 
"During those years [I933 to 19391," Welles's account of what he called 
"the tragic years" concluded, "among the highest officials of this Govern- 
ment only the President himself had emphatically sounded the note of 
danger-and he was at once accused of 'warmongering.' For in a democ- 
racy such as ours the people must be kept fully and continuously in- 
formed. Except by the President they were not so inf~rmed."~O As a1- 
ready noted and as will be observed in the discussion of the official 
diplomatic documents published in the 1950's, Welles's account was far 
from the whole story. It seems only right to add, however, that by the 
time those documents appeared in the Foreign Relations volumes, a decade 
later, the general public had lost most, if not all, of its interest in the 
history of prewar American diplomacy, and Welles had succeeded in 
making a significant contribution to the myth of Roosevelt as the keeper 
of the democratic faith in the age of the Munich era. 
Four years later, in March 1948, Secretary Hull, who had resigned his 
position in November 1944, published his own account of American 
foreign policy in the age of Roosevelt. Unlike Welles, who dealt with the 
Munich era in two summary chapters, Hull devoted nearly two hundred 
pages to this period, quoting extensively from unpublished-and presum- 
ably classified-State Department documents, most of which were not 
published or available to interested scholars until the 1950's. There is no 
question that Hull's account of those years was both significant and 
revealing, although perhaps not exactly in the fashion which Hull had 
intended. 
Like Welles, Hull seems never to have doubted that Hitler meant war. 
"There could be no shadow of doubt," he remembered back to Hitler's 
first years in power, "that Germany was rearming, with all that such 
rearming meant in the way of political disturbance and, eventually, 
war."gi If Hull foresaw these developments even in 1933-and there is 
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no reason to disbelieve his subsequent recollection-his response to the 
spread of aggression after that date seems all the more ineffective. 
Hull's response to Hitler's reinstitution of conscription in March 1935 was 
characteristic of his, and Roosevelt's, response to what Churchill later called 
"the gathering storm." As Hull saw it, by this particular action Germany had 
"tossed overboard the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. . . . She 
was preparing for conquest," On the other hand, the United States, although 
signatory, had not ratified that treaty, and thus at a press conference a week 
later Hull confined himself to the meaningless statement that "everybody 
knows that the United States has always believed that treaties must consti- 
tute the foundation on which any stable peace structure must rest. All who 
believe in peaceful settlement of international problems of all kinds have felt 
increasing concern over the tendency to fail to live up to the letter and spirit 
of treatie~."~' It is difficult to believe that such words made any significant 
impression in ~ e r l i n , ~ ~  Rome, or Tokyo, while in London and Paris Hull's 
statement might well have anticipated Neville Chamberlain's reaction after 
reading Roosevelt's "Quarantine Speech" in October 1937: "It is always best 
and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words."94 
Hull was not long finding out that there was indeed a connection between 
armaments and aggression, in Europe and the rest of the world. Thus Hull 
recalled a cable from Ambassador Dodd in Berlin on March 22, 1935-the 
same day on which Hull made the press conference statement quoted 
above-stating that "Japan was pressing the Germans to ask for the restora- 
tion of German naval strength."95 Hull drew the appropriate conclusion: "It 
was therefore obvious that we had to watch not only a rapidly rearming 
Germany or a militant, conquering Japan, but a combination or alliance of 
both, working hand in hand to bring pressure to bear on other nations at 
strategic moments and places, and being joined in due course by Fascist 
Italy. The events to come were assuming shape."96 
There was little doubt that the shape of things to come was clearer with 
every passing week and month, but what was not assuming shape was an 
effective response to the growing menace of spreading international aggres- 
sion. In a long and tortured account of the struggle over neutrality legisla- 
tion, the Italian attack on Ethiopia, and the Spanish Civil War, Hull recalled 
that by the middle of 1935 "an avalanche of isolationism was overwhelming 
any prospect of inducing the American people to agree to a more vital share 
in world  affair^,"^' but it is apparent from Hull's memoirs that the Secretary 
of State was no more prepared than was Roosevelt to do battle with this 
isolationist tide. To be sure, Hull recalled with considerable bitterness the 
work of the Nye Committee, of which he remarked that "by impugning the 
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motives and honesty of President Wilson in the First World War, by etching 
a sordid caricature of our former associates, Britain and France, and by 
whitewashing the Kaiser's Germany, . . . [the committee] gave the American 
people a wholly erroneous view as to the reasons why we had gone to war 
in 1917."9g 
As Hull's Memoirs made clear, neither the Secretary nor the President was 
ready for an open confrontation with the Nye Committee, whose effect, as 
Hull rightly observed, '"was to throw the country into the deepest isolation- 
ism at the very moment when our influence was so vitally needed to help 
ward off the approaching threat of war abroad." The committee "showed the 
prospective aggressors in Europe and Asia that our public opinion was 
pulling a cloak over its head and becoming nationally unconcerned with 
their designs and that therefore they could proceed with fuller c~nf idence ."~~ 
It seems apparent also that even when Hull, for one, sought to impose certain 
limits upon administration cooperation with the Nye Committee-especially 
as regards the furnishing of certain official documents which the committee 
desired to use for purposes of its own-Roosevelt seemed unwiIling to go 
along with his Secretary of State. Thus Hull recalled that on March, 15, 1935, 
he sent Roosevelt a memorandum urging the President to call the committee 
to the White House to advise it "to refrain from any unneccessary agitation 
in public hearings of questions which would handicap this Government in 
its relations with other G~vernments.""'~ Roosevelt did indeed meet with the 
Nye committee at the White House four days later, "but for some reason"- 
Hull did not specdate on what that reason might have been - "Roosevelt did 
not mention my request"lO' and the Nye committee went on in its irrespon- 
sibIe way.Io2 
If Hull was obviousIy disturbed by Roosevelt's attitude toward that com- 
mittee, it was a far different story so far as official policy toward the Spanish 
Civil War was concerned. "The President and I," Hull recalled, "were in 
complete agreement in our policy of non-intervention in Spain throughout 
the war";Io3 and, whereas Welles had bitterly attacked American policy, Hull 
offered a warm defense: "The policy of the United States was . . . in full 
accord with that expressed by the European nations. . . . As time went on, 
this policy came more and more under attack from certain elements in this 
country. Some of the more extreme sections have not yet forgiven the Roose- 
velt Administration for its refusal to become involved in the Spanish conflict 
by aiding the Government there to the dangerous extent they demanded."lo4 
This is not to say that Roosevelt or the Democratic Party, which Hull had 
served faithfully and long for so many years in the Senate and House of 
Representatives, paid greater heed to the Secretary's recommendations on 
broader foreign policy questions. Thus Hull recorded, with some bitterness 
and resentment, that the Democratic platform of 1936 completely ignored 
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the State Department's carefully drafted recommendati~nsl~~ on that sub- 
ject, with the result that the party's foreign-policy plank-"one short para- 
graph'Lseemed to Hull "a jumble of ideas or theories in which different 
persons had stuck their respective notions. It lugged in the theories about 
bankers and munitions manufacturers which the Nye Committee had ex- 
ploited to the limit, and its reference to neutrality was directly in conflict with 
a world organization to preserve the peace."Io6 
Hull left no doubt that he was deeply disturbed by the national 
convention's work. "I was dumbfounded, when the platform came out, to 
read the planks on tariffs and foreign affairs, which utterly ignored the 
suggestions I had submitted. I left the convention [in Philadelphia] after the 
[platform] committee made its report and went to Atlantic City with Mrs. 
Hull. . . . I protested to the President about these planks, but he gave me no 
reply of any consequence."107 The implications of Roosevelt's unresponsive- 
ness should have been clear to Hull. In the summer of 1936 foreign affairs 
meant little or nothing to Roosevelt, and the one compaign speech he de- 
voted to the subject - his address at Chautaugua in AugustIo8 -was one of 
the most unfortunate he ever delivered on the subject. 
Although Hull did not say so, such presidential indifference, combined 
with the Secretary's own calculated restraint, could not have been, and no 
doubt was not, lost on the Germans, the Italians, and the Japanese. If 1937 
was, as Churchill later described it, "the loaded pause,"lo9 and if the Japanese 
took advantage of this pause, Hull nevertheless in this period continued to 
defend official policy which, in effect, sought to steer a middle course be- 
tween "the extremes" of interventionism and isolationism. Thus for instance, 
at the Brussels Conference of November 1937, Hull vigorously defended 
American policy. "The impression has been created at Brussels," Hull cabled 
Norman H. Davis, the head of the American delegation to that conference 
on November 17, 1937, "that the other States represented there are willing 
and eager to adopt methods of pressure against Japan provided the United 
States would do so. . . . I invite your attention . . . to the fact that questions 
of methods of pressure against Japan are outside the scope of the present 
~onference."~'O Looking back on Brussels ten years later, Hull remained 
satisfied with that policy which, he concluded, prevented Japan "from im- 
posing her own peace on China. . . . It kept her from freeing herself for the 
conquest of all Asia. . . . It gave American public opinion time to perceive 
the basic issues involved. It gave the American Government time to prepare 
for the life-and-death struggle the Japanese war lords were planning."Ifl 
Such restraint, it seems clear, did not affect the desire of the virulently 
isolationist members of Congress to impose the strongest possible re- 
strictions on the President's warmaking powers. Their efforts, as already 
observed, centered around the Ludlow Resolution, a proposal for a consti- 
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tutional amendment to require a popular referendum before war, save in 
case of attack on American territory, could be declared.lI2 As HulI remem- 
bered, "to the President and me, the Ludlow Resolution seemed a disastrous 
move toward the most rigid form of isolationism. . . . If the resolution 
passed . . . it would indicate to the world that the nation no longer trusted 
the Administration to conduct its foreign affairs. It would serve notice on 
the aggressor nations that they could take any action anywhere in the world 
in direct vioIation of our rights and treaties, with little if any likelihood of 
any concrete reaction from Washington.""3 
From what has already been said, it should be clear that such apprehen- 
sion on Secretary Hull's part was by no means unfounded, and Hull recorded 
with satisfaction the efforts made by Roosevelt and himself to block adop- 
tion of the Ludlow Resolution. These efforts proved in the end to be success- 
ful, but Hull neglected to say that some, perhaps most, of the most vigorous 
efforts in favor of this dubious measure came from the more liberal or radical 
members of the Democratic Party (many of whom, as already observed, had 
been elected in the Democratic landslide of 1936); that the President and his 
administration had waited until it was almost too Iate to defeat the proposal; 
that Roosevelt's evident unwillingness to oppose the international outlook 
of many newly elected members of Congress was in sharp contrast with his 
determination to alter the composition of the Supreme C ~ u r t ; " ~  and that, 
although the administration ultimately prevailed in its efforts to block the 
Ludlow Resolution (and thus discourage similar proposals), the ensuing 
struggle may well have reinforced Hitler's determination to press ahead with 
his plans for the mastery of Europe-plans which he unveiled to his military 
leaders at a top secret conference in the Reich chancellory in Berlin on 
November 5, 1937.1i5 The conflict also may have reinforced Neville Cham- 
berlain, who had become British Prime Minister in May 1937, and other 
members of the British and French governments, in their conviction that, in 
any future conflict with Hitler and Mussolini, not to mention Japan, they 
might well have to fight alone. This, given their limited military strength, 
made it seem to them all the more necessary to attempt to reach some sort 
of accommodation with the aggressor states. 
This state of mind, of course, underlay the policy of appeasement which, 
begun in the 1920's and early 1930's under very different circum~tances,~l~ 
reached a climax in 1938, beginning with the uncontested German annexa- 
tion of Austria in March of that year. Two days after that event-of whose 
coming Hull and the State Department had been warned for some time"' 
-Hull delivered an address on the foundations of American foreign policy 
before the National Press Club in Washington. In that address, whose text 
Roosevelt had approved enthusiastically in advance of its delivery ("C. H. 
Grand! F.D.R."""), Hull stresses the necessity for rearmament but empha- 
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sized-as the critics of American foreign policy in the Vietnam era would 
doubtless have been pleased to hear-that "we did not have the slightest 
intention to police the world." It is, said Hull on that occasion, "our pro- 
found conviction that the most effective contribution which we can make to 
peace-in the tragic conditions with which our people, in common with the 
rest of mankind, are confronted today-is to have this country respected 
throughout the world for integrity, justice, good will, strength, and unswerv- 
ing loyalty to principles."li9 
Hull believed, as he put it in his memoirs, that "further than this speech 
we could not go. The points I made would not please an isolationist de- 
termined to confine us to our shores. They would not please an international- 
ist determined to commit us to alI iance~." '~~ 
Although it seems doubtful whether, by early 1938, this policy of attempt- 
ing to steer a middle course between isolationism and interventionism any 
longer served a useful purpose, there can be little doubt that there was much 
to be said for Hull's determined opposition to the grandiose peace plans 
Roosevelt and Welles were considering in 1937- 1 938.12' From everything 
now known about the intentions of the dictators-and from everything that 
was known a t  the time-it seems highly unlikely that the kind of spectacular 
peace initiative which the President and his Under Secretary of State had in 
mind would produce any substantial re~u1ts . l~~  
Regarding Hitler's intentions in the spring and summer of 1938 there was 
no longer the slightest doubt. Czechoslovakia was clearly his next intended 
victim. To the story of American policy during the Munich crisis Hull added 
a number of important details, one of them being that American policy did 
not change essentially during the course of the crisis. Hull recalled, for 
instance, that on August 16 he had delivered a major radio address designed 
"to show our own people that an isolationist position would not protect them 
from the effects of a major war elsewhere," and "to state to the Axis nations 
as emphatically as I could, considering the isolationist sentiment in the 
United States, that they could not count us out in pursuing their plans for 
Not surprisingly, such a policy gave no material comfort to the belea- 
guered democracies and did not dissuade Hitler from his chosen path. On 
September 8, William C. Bullitt telegraphed a confidential inquiry from 
French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet whether Roosevelt "would be 
willing to act as arbitrator in case of dire necessityH-a question Bonnet had 
previously posed to Bullitt on July 13.IZ4 Needless to say, Hull and the State 
Department discreetly turned aside both inquiries. As the Foreign Relations 
documents on the Munich crisis published in 1955 were to show, during that 
crisis the Department received a steady stream of information from all the 
major European capitals.lZ5 There was no shortage of information in Wash- 
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ington. It was something else, however, to put that information to appropri- 
ate use. 
On September 21 the Canadian and Hungarian ministers paid separate 
calls on Secretary Hull, who told them: 
S~nce August a year ago I have proceeded here on the theory th& Japan definitely contem- 
plates secunng domination over as many hundreds of millions of people as possible in 
Eastern Asia and gradually extending her control through the Pacific islands to the Dutch 
East Indies and elsewhere, thereby dominating in practical effect that half of the world. 
. . . And at the same time I have gone on the theory that Germany is equally bent on 
becoming the dominating colossus of continental ~ u r o ~ e . ' ' ~  
This being so, it may seem strange that as the Munich crisis neared its climax 
Hull did not move, at least in private, to align the United States more fully 
on the side of the democracies. But it seems clear that Hull made no such 
effort, not only perhaps because he feared the reaction of the powerful 
isolationist elements whose efforts he frequently lamented, but more likely 
also because he knew that the policy he was pursuing was in line with 
Roosevelt's own thinking and the policy the President wished him to pursue. 
Although Roosevelt was clearly reluctant, if not entirely unwilling, to 
assume a leading role in the desperate search for peace in late August and 
September,I2' the democratic governments did not abandon their efforts to 
enlist his aid. On September 24, for instance, Bullitt cabled from Paris 
suggesting that Roosevelt propose a meeting of the British, French, German, 
Italian, and Polish chiefs of state at The Hague-carefully omitting all 
mention of the President of Czechoslovakia, Eduard Benes' -to resolve the 
mounting crisis.I2* The following day Benes', acting through the American 
minister in Prague, asked Roosevelt to "urge the British and French not to 
desert Czechoslovakia and allow her destruction, thereby bringing closer a 
great conflict embracing not only Czechoslovakia but also the world."'2q 
Roosevelt ignored BeneS's appeal, and instead proceeded with one last 
initiative of his own, an effort Hull sought to discourage on the ground, as 
he recalled teIling Roosevelt, that he felt that "nothing short of a sufficient 
amount of force or complete capitulation would halt Hitler in the pursuit of 
his plans. This meant that any steps to deal with him short of suitable force 
would necessarily be of an appeasement nature and purely temp~rary.""~ 
To be sure, there were limits beyond which even Roosevelt could or would 
not go. Like Hull, he declined to accept Bullitt's suggestion, made on Sep- 
tember 25, that he offer himself as impartial arbitrator; and he likewise said 
no to Chamberlain's proposal, put forth on the 26th, that he be allowed to 
address the American people by radio the following eveningI3' -a refusal 
which was bound to confirm Chamberlain's previously expressed conviction 
that "it is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans 
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but words."132 There followed, as will be seen, Roosevelt's last appeal to 
Mussolini and Hitler in which Roosevelt proposed "an immediate confer- 
ence in some neutral spot."133 On the surface these appeared to be significant 
peace-keeping efforts, but, as Hull conspicuously failed to note, underlying 
all of Roosevelt's last minute appeals for peace was the unspoken assumption 
that the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was only a matter of place and 
time. There is no evidence, even presented by Roosevelt's partisans, that the 
President thought, much less was ready to propose, that the question of 
transferring the Sudeten area, with all that such a transfer implied for the 
future of Czechoslovakia, should be considered on its merits and not on the 
basis of propagandistic and threatening German claims. 
As regards the question whether American diplomacy, including 
Roosevelt's personal efforts, affected the ultimate outcome of the crisis, Hull 
found it "impossible to say . . . whether the actions taken by the President 
brought about" the Munich conference. "Undoubtedly," Hull concluded, 
"they exercised considerable infl~ence." '~~ It seems only fair to add that in 
his account Hull, like Welles, did not mention Roosevelt's congratulatory 
telegram to Chamberlain;135 and as regards the outcome of the four power 
conference, Hull says nothing about Roosevelt's personal reaction,'36 but 
recalled that he himself had been "skeptical" of the results while Welles had 
been "optimi~tic,"'~~ broadcasting to the country, a few days later, as already 
noted, that the prospects of "a new world order based upon justice and upon 
law were perhaps better than at any time during the past two de~ades."'~8 
Hull recalled that "it seemed to me that the colors in the picture were much 
darker,'"39 but he failed to mention the ill-starred, not to say rather tasteless, 
efforts of some administration supporters to paint the Munich settlement as 
a great victory of Rooseveltian diplomacy. The point did not escape Arthur 
Krock, the increasingly anti-New Deal Washington correspondent of The 
New York Times.I4O 
In the last hours of the Munich crisis a scene took plac: at the State 
Department that reminds one of the last phase of the truce negotiations in 
Vietnam in late 1972, during which the United States apparenti;~ promised 
substantial postwar economic assistance to the North Vietnames.: govern- 
ment, and reminds one further that at about the same time the United States 
also increased its efforts to step up trade with the Soviet Union despite the 
fact that the USSR had been a principal supplier of war matitriel to the i.rorth 
Vietnamese.I4l 
On the morning of September 28, the German ambassador, Dr. Ha ,~s  
Dieckhoff, just returned from Berlin, had an interview with Secretary Hull 
in the course of which, according to the latter, he "denied that Hitler had 
world ambitions" or that Hitler "wanted to acquire dominion over the terri- 
tory of others." On the contrary, Dieckhoff reported that he had talked with 
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Hitler who was "taking a genuine interest in the United States and realized 
that readjustment of trade practices by his Government and also of the 
Jewish situation would be important, if not vital, in restoring satisfactory 
relations between the two countries." Hull replied that he "was deeply grat- 
ified to hear this." There was, Dieckhoff went on to say, "a growing interest 
among German high officials, from Hitler on down, in economic and trade 
relations. '~ull responded that he felt sure "that if the German Government 
decides to change its course and adopt our liberal commercial policy, . . . 
capital and businessmen in other countries would immediately discover [the 
German] Government's basic change of policy, and your manufacturers 
would soon get credit with which to pay for raw  material^."'^^ But unlike the 
administration in office thirty-five years later, Hull made no offer of eco- 
nomic assistance, although the door to "economic appeasementv-a form of 
appeasement seriously considered, if not yet formally implemented, in Lon- 
don143 -was clearly left ajar also in Washington. 
It is one of the oddities of book reviewing that the aspects of a particular 
volume or voIumes that might attract the most attention or publicity upon 
their publication may appear much less interesting and important a genera- 
tion or two later. Thus when Hull's memoirs first appeared, in 1948, they 
received high praise especially for his fulsome exposition and defense of 
American policy toward Vichy France and French North Africa in 1940- 
1942, at that time a highly controversial subject.144 Little attention was paid 
to Hull's account of American diplomacy in the Munich era, partly perhaps 
because there was then so little difference of opinion about the meaning of 
that period, second, because-in the absence of additional documentation- 
the course of American foreign policy in the Munich era had not yet at- 
tracted much scholarly attention, and, finally, because with the end of the 
war and Roosevelt's sudden death still fresh in public memory, the prevailing 
image of the President's prewar policies was still that of the staunch prophet 
and indomitable defender of democracy.145 
Hull's account, although undoubtedly not designed for that purpose, 
should have sufficed to cast considerable doubt on Roosevelt's reputation 
in this regard, but such was not the case. Nor was Hull's personal response 
to the spread of aggression subjected to critical examination. In the absence 
of additional evidence, it would appear that Hull followed the course of 
action he did not only because he knew that it was in general accord with 
the President's own views, but because as one of the few surviving Wilsoni- 
ans, he seems to have believed that, considering the disillusioned political 
and intellectual climate of the period, he was doing about as much as he 
could to discourage and contain the spread of aggression, The best example 
of Hull's posture in this regard may have been his dogged insistence on the 
continued non-recognition of certain foreign conquests, notably Italy's occu- 
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pation of Ethiopia, which, as Hull remarked with understandable satisfac- 
tion, the United States had never formally re~0gnized. l~~ This was one way 
in which, at minimum political risk, Hull could continue to cling to some 
tenets of the old Wilsonian faith. It seems clear also that Hull was not for 
a moment influenced by the highly one-sided and propagandistic efforts of 
such bodies as the Nye Committee to impugn the veracity of President 
Wilson and his deep devotion to peace. Thus at the height of the Nye 
Committee's activities in January 1935 the normally restrained Secretary of 
State told a press conference with considerable feeling: "I served here in an 
official capacity during the Wilson Administration and, needless to say, in 
common with the American public, I have the highest-I had and have 
always maintained-the highest regard for his patriotism and scrupulous 
Such statements, however deeply felt and passionately delivered, did not 
and could not reverse the powerful anti-Wilsonian tide, which in a sense was 
at the heart of the neutralist or isolationist temper of the time. If Hull's 
account of the Munich era contains a major shortcoming, it would seem to 
lie in his inability to recognize that he, Roosevelt, and the administration 
could not hope to win the battle for a truly responsible foreign policy unless 
they were prepared to confront a hostile or unreceptive political and intellec- 
tual climate, and by doing so reverse it.148 It was a symbolic expression of 
the prevailing diffidence of power, that they never really tried until, in 
1940-1941, it was nearly too Iate. 
111 
Despite the wealth of interesting details contained in the accounts of Ambas- 
sador Dodd and Secretary Hull, and the significant judgments of Secretary 
Stimson, the full story and significance of American policy in the years 
immediately preceding the second world war did not become known until 
the 1950's-first with the publication, in 1952, of Professors Langer and 
Gleason's The Challenge to Isolation 1937-1940 and the concurrent appear- 
ance of the State Department's Foreign Relations volumes on American 
diplomacy in the Munich era.149 
Based on a wealth of unpublished material from the files of the Depart- 
ment of State, from the Franklin D, Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, and 
from numerous other sources, superbly organized and closely reasoned, The 
Challenge to Isolation devoted only two opening chapters,Is0 but magnifi- 
cently achieved ones, to American diplomacy in the Munich era. It did not 
give Roosevelt or American policy high marks for perspicacity, foresight, or 
effectiveness. Assessing, for example, Mr. Roosevelt's much-discussed peace 
efforts in 1937-1938, Langer and Gleason conclude: 
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Since the publication of Axis records captured during the war, it has become perfectly patent 
that the ambitions of the Nazi leaders went far beyond what reasonable statesmen in other 
countries would have thought possible at the time, and that therefore the move contemplated 
by Mr. Roosevelt, llke the appeasement efforts of Mr. Chamberlain, would probably have 
been doomed to failure. Conceivably, a really strong stand by theunited States Government 
in support of the British mlght have changed the course of events, but the foregoing narrative 
should suffice to show that nothing of the kind was even remotely envisaged in Washmgton. 
Mr. Roosevelt andhisadv~serssympath~zed with the British and wished themwell in whatever 
efforts they felt constrained to make in the direction of peaceful adjustment, but there was 
never any questlon of approving or supporting their specific pollcy and certainly no thought 
of assumlng any polltical or mllitary commitment In connectior. with it. Under the circum- 
stances Hitler was perfectly safe in dlscountlng the influence of the United ~ t a t e s , ' ~ '  
Deplorable as it may be, the fact of the matter is that for a number of reasons 
Langer and Gleason's outstanding volumes, although warmly received, never 
quite achieved the recognition and influence they deserved.'S2 One reason may 
have been that their unsentimental treatment of Roosevelt's prewar foreign 
policy was-and indeed remains-difficult, if not impossible, for the late 
President's partisans to accept.'53 
By the early 1950's the American public was largely preoccupied with the 
Communist victory in China, with the protracted war in Korea, and the volatile 
charges of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, some of whose most valuable and 
influential supporters-including Robert A. Taft-had long been critical of 
Roosevelt's prewar foreign policy, although not for the reasons carefully 
spelledout by Langerand Gleason but on theallegedground that theRoosevelt 
administration had needlessly, if indeed not deliberately, involved the United 
States in another world conflict.'54 
It was about the same time-the early 1950's-that the Department of State's 
outstanding documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States 
reached the years after 1933 and that scholars and the interested public alike 
were able to assess for themselves the precise role the United States had played 
in world affairs in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 
September 1939. 
By the early 1950's, however, the public which had avidly followed the dra- 
matic disclosures in Churchill's war memoirs had begun to lose interest in the 
prewar period, and even James MacGregor Burns's The Lion and the Fox-the 
first volume of his outstanding biography of Roosevelt which appeared in 1956 
and which contained an excellent account of the President's diplomacy in the 
Munich era-failed to achieveits full and deserved impact. As Professor Burns 
rightly pointed out: 
[Roosevelt] hoped that people would be educated by events; the error of this policy was that 
the dire eventsin Europe and Asla confirmed the American suspicion and fear of involvement 
rather than prodding them into awareness of the need for collectiveactionby thedemocrac~es. 
In short, a declslve act of interpretation was required, but Roosevelt did not interpret.lS5 
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In any case, whatever the reason, the publication of works like Langer and 
Gleason's and of Burns's biography did little or nothing to alter Roosevelt's 
firmly established image as an inveterate foe of despotism and totalitarian 
aggression before and after Pearl Harbor-an image carefully cultivated by 
most of the President's former associates and by such influential liberal 
writers as John Gunther, and subsequently Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.I56 
Even before World War I1 [Gunther wrote in Roosevell In Retrospect, published in 19501 
he had become the acknowledged leader not merely of American democracy but of that 
of the entire world. Roosevelt knew perfectly well that the climate of the United States was 
overwhelmingly isolationist. . . . Confusion, greed, cowardice, inertia paralyzed the public 
mind. . . . FDR understood Hitler, and this was a highiy important cofitribution; he 
managed to communicate to the United States how dangerous and menaclng he really was 
. . . what is more Roosevelt understood the philosophy behind Hitler, the state of mind 
that produced this ugly genius and monster. . . he knew that Hitler's real "secret weapon" 
was the ineptness, the complacency, and the selfishness of the democracies. . . . The 
President's correct appreciation of the malign forces then at work is the more remarkable 
in that he was so ~nadequately-even evilly-served by some of his ambassadors. Several 
notable emissaries were as isolationist as senators like Nye and [Burton K.] Wheeler. Then 
too FDR had to wage a running battle with venomous "minor league Metternichs" in his 
own State Department, some of whom came close to sabotaging their own chief.'" 
On the other hand, it must be said that Gunther, for one, was too 
independent and honest an observer of the contemporary scene to ignore or 
suppress contrary evidence. 
Many Americans today [Gunther wrote elsewhere in Roosevelt in Retrospect] consider 
soberly that he might have, and should have, taken a much stronger line against the Axis 
than he did . . . that his hesitations gave stimulus to the enemy, who may have been 
deluded into the notion that we would not fight no matter what. FDR, it seemed, forever 
tiptoed to the edge of a decision, then see-sawed away. His "lack of leadership," a member 
of Mr. Truman's present Cabinet once told me, "seemed almost criminal." The reason was 
of course that he had to continue to make every possible effort for peace in order to lacate 
antiwar and isolationist sentiment, and his hold on Congress was getting shaky. I P8 
This is not the place for a detailed critical appreciation of the documentary 
record contained in the Foreign Relations volumes on the Munich era, al- 
though it may be observed, without much fear of contradiction, that the 
evidence contained in these volumes told a rather different story from that 
which Mr. Roosevelt's uncritical admirers preferred to believe and continued 
to expound. To be sure, the Foreign Relations volumes left no doubt that 
throughout these years the United States had been represented abroad by 
a number of unusually competent and well-informed diplomats, including 
men like Robert W. Bingham in London, ClauJe G. Bowers in Madrid, 
William C. Bullitt first in Moscow and later in Paris, William E. Dodd in 
Berlin, Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo, Nelson T. Johnson in Chungking, and 
George S. Messersmith in Vienna. It was one thing, however, for the United 
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States to be represented by such able and perceptive diplomats, and quite 
another for Roosevelt to profit from their remarkably full and informative 
reports on what was happening abroad; and, as will become evident later, 
even most of the perspicacious diplomats mentioned above did not entirely 
escape the temptation to separate evidence and c o n c I ~ s i o n , ~ ~ ~  and to empha- 
size the case for American non-involvement on the increasingly troubled 
international scene,I6O in their reporting and in their personal communica- 
tions with the President. 
It may be said, then, that the Foreign Relations volumes included hundreds 
of cables, letters, and other reports showing how the political, diplomatic, 
and military situation in Europe and elsewhere in the world had steadily 
deteriorated after 1933. 
The great majority of citizens had not the slightest idea of the existence, 
much less of the invaluable contents, of these impressive documentary vol- 
umes, which were invariably ignored by even the most widely respected book 
reviews. However, their publication left little doubt that President Roose- 
velt-who had personally appointed every one of these diplomats, who were 
in a technical sense his personal representatives to the governments to which 
they were accredited-was probably the best informed head of state in the 
world. Moreover, in addition to these formal diplomatic reports, the Presi- 
dent received throughout the prewar years, at his own request, a remarkable 
series of personal letters from his diplomatic representatives, letters which 
amplified and reinforced the information contained in their official des- 
patches, but which, with few exceptions, were not published until the appear- 
ance of the Nixon volumes in April 1969.16' 
But if the documents published in the Foreign Relations series left no doubt 
as regards the volume or quality of the President's foreign intelligence, they 
left no doubt either about Mr. Roosevelt's unwillingness to respond prompt- 
ly and effectively to the rising tide of totalitarianism and aggression, whether 
in Europe, Africa, or the Far East. To be sure, Mr. Roosevelt's wavering 
course as regards the London Economic Conference of June-July 1933-a 
course of action or inaction which did the United States considerable politi- 
cal and diplomatic damage-had long been public knowledge, but as things 
turned out this was only the first and perhaps one of the least damaging of 
the President's egregious diplomatic blunders. 
It should be pointed out that Roosevelt's ineptitude in foreign affairs was 
not entirely overlooked even by those of his former associates who contin- 
ued, in the main, to hold him in high esteem. For example, in the closing 
pages of his affectionate memoir 1933: Characters in Crisis, the late Herbert 
Feis, a t  that time Economic Adviser to the Secretary of State, recalled, 
that there was a great gap in thoughts about foreign affairs between [Roosevelt's] aspira- 
tions and his command of the means of attaining them was evidenced in an address he 
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made on December 28 [I9331 at the annual dlnner of the band of Woodrow Wilson 
devotees-of which he had once been the leader. The crystal and sllver on the white table 
cloths as well as the uplooking faces all gleamed the more warmly as he spoke. But h ~ s  
utterance, I reflected as I listened, was really a speech in defense of havlng to turn at least 
half way from Wilsonian Ideas, and of the American people for requiring h ~ m  to do so. 
In this he seemed to me to be trying to cover over or cover up the gap, but he failedSifi2 
It was not long before the Roosevelt administration began to give more 
concrete demonstration of its response to the growing world crisis. "We are 
furthermore willing," Norman H. Davis, a close friend of the President and 
chairman of the American delegation to the General Disarmament Confer- 
ence at Geneva, told a meeting of the General Commission of that confer- 
ence on May 29, 1934, "in connection with a general disarmament conven- 
tion, to negotiate a universal pact of non-aggression and to join with other 
nations in conferring on international problems growing out of any treaties 
to which we are a party," but-as if to emphasize the schizophrenic nature 
of American foreign policy-he quickly added that "the United States will 
not, however, participate in European political negotiations and settlements 
and will not make any commitment whatever to use its armed forces for the 
settlement of any dispute anywhere."'63 
Shortsighted as were his policies during the London Economic Confer- 
ence, unreassuring as was his address to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 
and discouraging as was American policy at the Geneva Disarmament Con- 
ference, far more ominous was Mr. Roosevelt's inadequate response to sever- 
al other fateful international crises preceding Munich, including the Rhine- 
land crisis, the Spanish Civil War, and finally the Nine Power or Brussels 
Conference of late 1937. In all these instances the Foreign Relations volumes 
told the essential story of Rooseveltian diplomacy in damaging detail. 
As regards the Rhineland crisis, the Foreign Relations documents (pub- 
lished in late 1953) revealed that on March 8, 1936, the day after German 
military forces had moved into the demilitarized zone, the French Govern- 
ment, acting through Jesse Isidor Straus, former President of R. H. Macy 
and a close personal friend of the President, asked "that [because of 
England's vacillation] some statement might be made by [the President] or 
by the Secretary of State condemning on moral grounds any unilateral 
repudiation of a treaty. . . the President's words would have wide attention 
and real effect particularly in England," to which Straus-who doubtless 
knew what sort of response the President wanted made to such a request- 
replied that "in view of the state of public opinion in the United States on 
the question of neutrality I could not comment on [the] request or on the 
reception it might encounter but that I would be glad [to] transmit it in the 
precise terms in which [it] had [been] outlined . . . to me."'64 
Coming as it did less than eight months before the Presidential election, 
and although made through diplomatic channels, the French request must 
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have been an acute embarrassment to Roosevelt. To be sure, the French 
Government had not asked the United States for direct assistance in the 
crisis, nor indeed was it suggesting any specific course of action. The French 
no doubt hoped, however, that the President would make some sort of 
statement that would clearly align the United States on the side of Britain 
and France and against this latest German violation of its international 
obligations. 
Roosevelt, who was no stranger to the subtleties of international relations, 
quickly perceived the possible danger the French request posed to his studied 
policy of American neutrality. Even before the French request was formally 
received in Washington, the question of American interest in the continued 
demilitarization of the Rhineland had been referred to the legal experts of 
the Department of State. After examining the appropriate documents, espe- 
cially the separate American-German peace treaty of Berlin of October 1921, 
they quickly came to the conclusion that while the latter treaty gave the United 
States all the rights and privileges the treaty of Versailles had given Britain 
and France, the treaty of Berlin made no mention of the demilitarization of 
the Rhineland, thus relieving the United States of any formal obligation to 
act or even to express a formal opinion as regards Hitler's move,165 
The French Government was at once informed accordingly. "We under- 
stand and appreciate thoroughly the French Government's desire that we 
give a public statement with regard to the present situation," Secretary of 
State Hull cabled Ambassador Straus in Paris, "but I feel sure that they will 
also understand that in view of the procedure provided for application to the 
present situation we do not feel that we could appropriately make any 
comment at this time."166 It is not known whether the French Government 
made any response to this message. It requires no special powers of imagina- 
tion, however, to surmise what the reaction of the French Government was 
when the formal American response was delivered in Paris a few days later. 
It remained for George S. Messersmith, the American minister in Austria, 
and one of the truly outstanding diplomats of his time, to sum up the 
significance of Hitler's Rhineland coup, and he did so in a magnificent 
memorandum to Secretary Hull on March 9, 1936 (a memorandum which 
should be required reading for every student of the 1930's and of contempo- 
rary world politics): 
Perhaps the most important slngle basic factor disturb~ng Europe today IMessersmith 
began] 1s that facts are not belng generally faced and glven the interpretation which 
common sense d~ctates and met with the action which elementary prudence obviously 
requires. This applies whether the facts be political, economlc or fiscal. 
The greatest danger and the one which threatens to destroy Europe is not facing the facts 
with respect to Germany and Italy, particularly with respect to Germany, In which the 
situation 1s essent~ally more dangerous, because of its nature and the potentlal power of 
the forces behlnd it.. . . Europe is now hampered in faclng facts through an unprepared 
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public opinion. Even m some of the best informed foreign offices and in some well 
informed financial and industnal circles there is a tendency to hold to ~lluslons. . . The 
fundamental fact which Europe has to face today is that the Nat~onal Socialist regime in 
Germany is based on a program of ruthless force, which program has for its aim, first, the 
enslavement of the German population to a National Socialist social and political program, 
and then to use the forces of these 67 million people for the extens~on of German political 
and economlc sovereignty over South-Eastern Europe-thus putting it into a position to 
dominate Europe completely and to place France and England definitely in the position 
of secondary powers. From this position of vantage the National Sociahst program contem- 
plates that Germany will be able to dictate its policies to the rest of the world. 
Hitler had already made substantial progress toward that goal and unless his 
methods and tactics were understood and effectively countered, the prospect 
for avoiding the triumph of National Socialism were dim indeed. 
If the present progress of fulfillment of the National Socialist program continues, she will 
become the most powerful country in Europe and ~ t s  dictator, without striklng a warlike 
blow. . . , It is known that Natlonal Socialist Germany holds as one of its primary doctrines 
that agreements are only entered into as a means to an end, and that they must be 
denounced ruthlessly when they have served their purpose. . . . [Outside] Germany [Na- 
tional Socialism] knows how to play upon the fears of Europe as well as the better feelings 
of its people and governments. National Socialist Germany knows that Europe, with the 
memories of the horrors of the last war, does not want another. It knows that the veterans 
of the last war in every country, with the horrors of that war still so vivid In their minds, 
are inclined to listen to and support the peace moves from Germany.. . . The policy of 
National Socialism of a series of faits accomplis towards the gaining of its ends is, therefore, 
based on t h ~ s  idea that the fear of war outside of Germany wiIl keep off actual war against 
Germany or definite action against her until Germany herself IS ready to strike the crushing 
blow. 
Messersmith remindedHull that the remilitarization of the RhineIand had 
been anticipated for months and that it was clear that Austria was next on 
Hitler's list. 
At least four months ago, it was known what the next German move would be and that 
it would be the reoccupation of the Rhineland. It was known that this move would be made, 
and at the first opportune moment. This information came from party sources, and time 
has shown how correct i t  was. The same party sources indicated at that time that after the 
reoccupation of the Rhineland the next step would be the absorption of Austna. If HitIer 
endeavored to divert attention . . . from Austria to colonies, it IS only one of the character- 
istic moves of the Hitler rkgime. 
Summing up, Messersmith had no doubt as to what needed to be done and 
what lay ahead. 
The task for England and France is as difficult as any by which they have ever been 
confronted. The only solution would seem to lie in their determined and completecommon 
action expressed in such a way that ~t will be understandable to public opinion in Germany 
and throughout Europe and most unmlstakably to those in controI in Berlm. There is only 
one way to deal with the German regime of today, and that is to meet ~ t s  brutal ruthless 
action by an equally determined stand. It is the only language which that regime under- 
stands, as it is the only language which it can talk. . . . 
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It is up to Europe now to decide whether it will face the facts, and there IS still time. 
It is perhaps too much to say that this will be the last chance which Europe has to save 
itself from the ultimate catastrophe of a great war, but there are many indications that this 
is the turning point on which the future course towards the war or peace will be deter- 
mined.I6" 
In hismemorandum, Messersmith made no reference to the possible role of 
the United States in the stabilization of the European balance of power, but 
in a communication to Assistant Secretary Phillips, Messersmith made clear 
what the Rhineland coup might ultimately mean to the United States and- 
somewhat surprisingly perhaps-where he himself stood as regards Ameri- 
can intervention. 
I feel that we have a great interest in [British and French firmness] for if this question is 
settled now as it can be settled, the chances are 99 out of 100 that we can stay out of [any 
war risked in the process] and that it will soon be over. If there is weakness and the Germans 
are allowed to fortify their western frontier, a war in a year or so hence is inevitable if the 
rBgime is able to hold on that long, and in that case the chances of our being able to stay 
out will certainly be less than 50-50, and in my oplnion a good deal less, and thls is the 
opinion, as you know, of one who belleves so strongly that we should do everything to 
endeavor to stay out,'68 
It is not known whether Roosevelt saw Messersmith's memorandum to 
Secretary Hull, or what his response was if he did. In any event, as far as 
the United States was concerned, the remilitarization of the Rhineland was 
an accomplished fact and the government in Washington seemed disinclined 
to worry much about its immediate or long term consequences. 
No sooner had the shock waves from the Rhineland crisis begun to fade 
away than the United States and the other western democracies were con- 
fronted with another, and in some ways even more serious, challenge-the 
so-called Spanish Civil War. There can be little doubt that, for the first few 
days and weeks perhaps, the Spanish struggle was indeed the result of purely 
domestic issues, and that, initially at least, the Franco rebellion was entirely 
a Spanish affair. It seems clear that in several respects the Spanish Republi- 
can government had not managed its affairs well, and that there was doubt- 
less some justified reason for widespread disaffection in that long troubled 
land.169 On the other hand, whatever the domestic origins of the Spanish 
struggle, it seems equally clear that if Franco had not soon begun to receive 
substantial military assistance from Mussolini and Hitler, his rebellion 
would probably have been speedily crushed. Before long, the Spanish Civil 
War was no more an internal conflict than the Vietnam struggle of the 1960's 
and early 1970's; there is no longer any doubt that the ultimate triumph of 
Franco, in early 1939, was by no means the result of his greater wisdom and 
political vitality. It was the direct result of outside-that is, German and 
Italian-intervention. 
There is no question that Roosevelt's personal sympathies were from the 
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beginning of the struggle entirely on the side of the Republic. It seems likely 
also that Roosevelt was well aware that the policy of so-called "non-interven. 
tion"-which the British and French had incomprehensibly enough agreed 
on with the Axis powers'70 -was faithfully adhered to by the former and 
continually violated by the latter, and was in effect therefore a sure prescrip- 
tion for fascist victory. It seems equally clear that domestic political consid- 
erations were largely responsible for his unwillingness to speak out on behalf 
of the Republic and to find some means of allowing the embattled legitimate 
government to purchase arms for its defense. In retrospect, it seems likely 
that Roosevelt overestimated the degree of American Catholic support for 
the Franco rebels. But as is so often the case in history, appearances are more 
important than reality. So Roosevelt accepted-and eventually strongly de- 
fended17' -the misconceived policy of "non-intervention." 
There is no question either that RooseveIt and the Department of State 
were well informed about what was going on in Spain. The American ambas- 
sador there, Claude G. Bowers, the Jefferson biographer and Wilsonian 
Democrat, was one of Roosevelt's ablest and most conscientious diplo- 
m a t ~ . ' ~ ~  As the Foreign Relations documents on S~ain,~ublishedbetween 1954 
and 1956, show at length, Bowers bombarded Washington with a steady 
stream of telegrams and personal letters calling the government's urgent 
attention to what was going on in Spain and the meaning of those 
None of these messages seems to have had the slightest effect. On the 
contrary, as James MacGregor Burns has pointed out, Roosevelt's "first 
decisive step-taken significantly during the 1936 campaign-was to put a 
moral embargo on the export of arms to both sides."'74 Shortly after, he asked 
the Congress to ban all arms shipments to Spain under the existing neutrality 
act. Early in 1938 Roosevelt seems for a brief moment to have wavered and 
to have considered lifting the embargo, but he soon dropped the idea, sup- 
posedly because, as he told Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, "to raise the 
embargo would mean the loss of every Catholic vote in the coming fall 
election . . . and Democratic congressmen opposed 
The totalitarian states, of course, followed closely Roosevelt's response to 
the Spanish conflict, and the German government, as we know from its 
diplomatic documents captured during the second world war, was well aware 
of Roosevelt's "non-intervention" policy and the benefit it conferred on the 
rebel f0rces.1~~ It is more difficult to say what was the worldwide effect of 
Roosevelt's abstemious course, but the unwillingness of the United States to 
consider the global implications of the Ethiopian and Spanish conflicts 
undoubtedly encouraged those elements in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo who 
believed that the time had come to push their expansionist policies with new 
and undiminished vigor. 
While Washington and the other democratic capitals were still largely 
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concerned with the war in Spain, the struggle in China, which had been 
intermittently dormant the last few years, broke out with new intensity 
in the summer of 1937. And as regards the Far Eastern crisis of 1937- 
and particularly the Nine Power (or Brussels) Conference of November 
1937-the American response to the growing menace of Japanese expan- 
sion was no more reassuring to Britain, China, France, and Holland than 
had been the American response to Hitler's aggressive moves in Europe. 
The Nine Power treaty of 1922, to be sure, did not formally oblige the 
United States to take concerted action to preserve the territorial and 
political status quo in China. Indeed, Article VII of that treaty provided 
merely that "whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one 
of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, 
and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full 
and frank communication between the Contracting Parties concerned."l77 
Hence, although the status quo had clearly been challenged by repeated 
Japanese actions beginning with the Manchurian invasion of September 
1931, the United States never seriously considered joint action with Brit- 
ain, France, and Holland to counter Japanese moves against China. This 
was made unmistakably clear to the other democratic governments, and 
to their diplomatic representatives in Wa~hington . '~~ When Norman H. 
Davis, head of the American delegation to the Brussels conference, called 
on the President at Hyde Park just before sailing for Europe, in October 
1937, he was specifically instructed by Mr. Roosevelt not to enter into, 
indeed not even to discuss, any possible joint action with the other 
democracies to stop the spread of aggression in the Far East: 
it should be recognued by the British Cabinet [declared a Prestdent~al memorandum 
designed for Ambassador Davls's gu~dance] that there is such a thing as public oplnion 
in the Un~ted States, as well as in other nations . . . it is necessary for Mr. Davis and 
h ~ s  associates In the Nine Power meeting to make it clear at every step: (a) That the 
United States is In no way, and will not be in any way, a party to a joint actlon with 
the League of Nations. (b) That the Un~ted States pollcy does not envlsage the United 
States being pushed out in front as the leader in, or suggestor of, future act~on. (c) 
That on the other side of the picture, the United States cannot afford to be made, 
in popular opinion at home, a tall to the British kite, as has been charged and is now 
being charged by the Hearst press and 
Under these circumstances-and not because of the Japanese boycott of 
the conference (the reason frequently given for its failure)-the Brussels 
conference was doomed to certain failure from the moment of its convo- 
cation. After three weeks of pointless discussion, public and private, the 
conference was adjourned without proving anything except the continued 
disunity and ineffectiveness of the Western democracies, headed by the 
United States, in the face of spreading international lawlessness and 
aggression.k80 It is not difficult to imagine what conclusion the Japanese 
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Government-and for that matter the German also-drew from Ameri- 
can policy statements at Br~ssels. '~'  
As expected, other top officials in the Roosevelt administration followed 
faithfully the President's own neutralist stance. Thus following repeated 
German treaty violations after January 1933, Secretary of State Hull, as 
already noted, issued carefully worded statements in which he invariably 
deplored such German measures, but immediately qualified his disapproval 
by disavowing any direct American concern over such German action, leav- 
ing no doubt that the United States would take no steps to guard against 
additional German treaty violations in the future.'82 For instance, when 
Secretary Hull delivered such a pronouncement at a news conference two 
days after the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, the German am- 
bassador in Washington, Hans Luther, reported dutifully to Berlin that Mr. 
Hull had said that "although he was keeping himself informed of events in 
Europe, he had no cause at all to concern himself with the Rhineland 
question."183 
Sometimes, to be sure, President Roosevelt himself let the cat out of the 
bag. There is a good illustration of such an incident in Anthony Eden's 
memoirs of the 1930's. 
There now came [Eden wrote] in January 1936 from the other side of the Atlantic an 
indication of the potential strength and actual limitations of American policy. On January 
6th, President Roosevelt, in a public speech, roughly criticized the aims and methods of 
dictators. I heard from our Ambassador in BerIin that the Fiihrer was surprised and upset 
by these remarks. [Sir Enc] Phipps added, however, thaf this aspect of the President's 
speech carried no weight with Hitler, in cornpanson with Roosevelt's renewed declaration 
that America would in future remain aloof and observe neutrality in European affairs. 
'There has', Hitler said, according KO Phipps' report, 'been no development during recent 
years more welcome than this.'Ia4 
Three months afterward Hitler marched into the Rhineland, with the Amer- 
ican response already noted,and two summers later followed the Munich 
crisis. 
There have been many books on Munich, and this is not the place to 
discuss at length the history of American diplomacy during that crisis save 
to point out, as already suggested, that, at the height of the crisis, in Septem- 
ber 1938, Roosevelt revealed himself to be largely insensitive and indifferent 
to the needs and feelings of the democratic states-including Czechoslo- 
vakia. Yet, by the end of the crisis, Roosevelt emerged with his reputation 
as a champion of peace and freedom more firmly established than ever, and, 
although Roosevelt clearly approved of Chamberlain's course of action, the 
President himself was never tarnished with the brush of appeasement.Igs 
That Roosevelt should have thus escaped must be reckoned part of his 
charmed political life and reputation. It seems not to have occurred to most 
historians to ask whether Britain and France could have been expected to 
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stand by Czechoslovakia without some form or expression of support from 
the United States, and until very recently it was not clear whether Roose- 
veIt ever considered, or was ever confronted with, the question of wheth- 
er or not to express himself-publicly or through diplomatic channels-to 
the point where Hitler was likely to think twice about moving against 
Czechoslovakia. Although the Roosevelt Library has not yet published all 
its documents for this period, the recently printed correspondence of 
RooseveIt and Ambassador Bullitt confirms that the latter did, six weeks 
before Munich, pose the problem squarely for the President: 
Fear of the United States [Builitt wrote Roosevelt in a "personal and strictly confiden- 
tial letter" on August 17, 19381 is unquestionably a large factor in Hitler's hesitation 
to start a war. If, in September, Europe should again appear to be on the verge of 
war, a quiet conversation between you and the German ambassador in the White 
House might have more effect in deterring Germany from acting against Czechoslo- 
vakia with armed force than all the public speeches you or anyone else could make. 
You would not have to say anything except recite a few facts. Suppose you were to 
say that you hoped Germany was not about to place you In the same position In which 
President Wilson was placed in 1914. Suppose you should add that he must be as 
aware as you were that although public opinion in America before the commencement 
of the war in 1914 had been very favorable to Germany, public opinion in America 
was now most hostile to Germany; and that he must be as aware as you were that 
if war should begin between England and France on one side and Germany on the 
other, there was a possibility that the United States would be drawn in. 
You might add that you would be glad if he would transmit what you had said to 
Hitler and bid him good-bye.'86 
It is interesting to speculate, thirty-five years later, what might have 
happened if Roosevelt had indeed called in the German ambassador and 
talked to him as Bullitt had suggested. In the event, no such meeting ever 
occurred, no doubt in the first place for the reason that Roosevelt did 
not agree with Bullitt's suggestion and was determined to follow a very 
different course of action in the last weeks and days of the crisis. 
Thus the documentary record, as published in Foreign Relations of the 
United States in 1955, reveals for instance that when, on September 25, 
President BeneS of Czechoslovakia appealed to Roosevelt "to urge the 
British and French Governments . . . not to desert [his] country and 
permit it to be destroyed and thus bring nearer a greater conflict vital 
to them as well as to the peace of the ~ o r l d , " ' ~ '  Roosevelt declined to 
make any direct reply to Benei's appeal but instead, the following day, 
sent identical messages to Hitler, Chamberlain, Prime Minister Daladier 
of France and Benei, expressing to each his confidence that "so long as 
these negotiations continuem-this message, it should be noted, was dis- 
patched several days after the Czech Government had, under severest 
Anglo-French pressure, accepted Hitler's humiliating Godesberg terms- 
"so long will there remain the hope that reason and the spirit of equity 
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may prevail and that the world may thereby escape the madness of a 
new resort to war."188 
Even more deplorable was the message Roosevelt sent to Hitler on the 
evening of September 27. It conveniently sidestepped the question of Hitler's 
responsibility for the growing crisis, included an evocation of the fashionable 
theory of "peaceful change" (which held that the single most important 
characteristic of any international agreement was that all political and terri- 
torial changes should be made by "peaceful" means, however distasteful, 
dangerous, and unwise such changes might otherwise prove to be),Ig9 suggest- 
ed the possibility of an international conference to deal with Hitler's insatia- 
ble ego, and concluded with a reassertion of American determination to have 
nothing to do with any European political settlement. In all, it was a message 
that could not possibly have discomfited Hitler: 
The question before the world today, Mr. Chancellor [Roosevelt cabled Hitler], is not the 
question of errors of judgment or of injustice committed in the past.. . . It is, therefore, 
supremely important that negotiations should continue without interruption until a fair and 
constructive solution is reached. . . . Whatever existing differences may be, and what their 
merits may be-and upon them I do not and need not undertake to pass-my appeal is 
solely that negotiations be continued until a peaceful settlement is found, and thereby a 
resort to force be avoided. Present negotiations still stand open. They can be continued 
if you give the word. Should the need for supplementing them become evident, nothing 
stands in the way of widening their scope into a conference of all the nations directly 
interested in the present controversy. Such a meeting to be held immediately-in some 
neutral spot in Europe-would offer the opportunity for thls and correlated questions to 
be solved in a spirit of justice, of fair dealing, and, in all human probability, with greater 
permanence. Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner I am convinced that 
hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding 
historic service to all humanity. . . . The Government of the United States has no political 
involvement in Europe, and will assume no obligation in the conduct of present negotia- 
tions.lgO 
Worst of all, however, was the personal message to Ambassador Joseph P. 
Kennedy in London which Roosevelt wrote out in his own hand at the White 
House upon being informed that Neville Chamberlain had just told a 
stunned House of Commons in London that he accepted Mussolini's invita- 
tion to meet with him, Hitler, and Daladier at Munich the next day-a 
message which was dispatched from Washington at 1 p.m. September 28. 
The message read simply: 
Personal for the Ambassador. Transmit urgently following message to Prime Minister 
Chamberlain: "Good Man. Signed Franklin D. ~ooseve l t . " '~~  
Within forty-eight hours Roosevelt, together with Neville Chamberlain, 
was being inundated with, and graciously accepting, the voluminous plaudits 
of a grateful world for everything he had done to save mankind from the 
ravages of another great war.''' 
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It remained for George Messersmith, whom Roosevelt had by that time 
brought back from Vienna and appointed Assistant Secretary of State, to 
sum up the meaning of the Munich crisis and settlement as he had so 
presciently commented on the Rhineland coup thirty months earlier. In a 
memorandum addressed to Secretary Hull on September 29, 1938, Messer- 
smith wrote: 
Needless tosay I shared yesterday the general relief which was felt by,I am sure, all of 
us when the news came over the ticker that an immediate outbreak of hostilities was to 
be avoided by the four-power meeting at Munich today. I believe, however, that thoughtful, 
well-informed persons must have this optimism and relief seriously tempered by fears that 
the greatest mistakes made in handling the European and German problem may be made 
now. If, in the desire to avoid the war with which Hitler is threatening Europe and the 
world, too far-reaching concessions are made, we will find that instead of arranging for 
peace a war has been made inevitable.. . . If arrangements are made at  Munich now or 
in a general conference elsewhere later which are a cynical sellout of principle-just to 
avoid a war, and if Hitler will get promises of economic help, which he is certain to ask 
for, it will mean that the present Government in Germany will be solidified in power, given 
permanence and means to exist and fatten, and then through the avoidance of war now 
we should only have put Germany in a position to carry through successfully the war which 
she intends to fight and which she is not in a position to wage successfully now. 
I do not wish to assume [Messersmith continued] and am not assuming a defeatist 
attitude. I have continuously from the beginning of the totalitarian regimes endeavored to 
maintain a constructive but at the same time a realistic attitude. To face the real situation 
is not taking a defeatist attitude but a realistic one. The Germany with which certain 
arrangements could have been made under Stresemann and Briiningis a different Germany 
from the one we have to deal with under Hitler today in many ways. And arrangements 
which were then possible, and which would have been constructive, are today impossible 
until there IS a regime of law and order in Germany. Certain economic arrangements will 
eventually have to be made and should be made as soon as possible but they can only be 
made with safety with a Government in Germany which has definite respect for the rights 
of others-large and small-and which is not aimed at world domination. 
Messersmith concluded: 
It is necessary for us, as I feel all of us in this country will, to keep our heads and maintain 
the long-range view. There are grave dangers in the situation even in this country. A few 
months after the present Government came into power, Goebbels was telling me what the 
Party was going to do in order to regiment the German population in every way and to 
make it an instrument of the state. I remarked that the methods which had been employed 
in Russia and which he was planning to employ in Germany would probably not be 
successful as the German population was much more intelligent and mformed. Goebbels, 
who is the most profound cynic in the world today, sald in German the equivalent of the 
following, "There is nothing so untrue which if repeated often enough all the people will 
not end in believing." As a fundamental practice of National Socialist Government this 
requires no eluctdation. How dangerously true ~t is 1s reflected in the growing opinion in 
this country that the Czechoslovakian Government has really oppressed and ravaged the 
Sudeten area. The world has apparently ended In belreving that what was in reality a certain 
unequal treatment of the Sudeten was in effect a regime of barbarity and oppression. There 
is food for thought in this.'93 
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Hull was so impressed with Messersmith's memorandum that he sent it 
on to President Roosevelt for his pe r~sa1 . l~~  It is not known if Roosevelt 
read Messersmith's memorandum, and if so, what he thought of it, but 
there will be few who, reading Messersmith's assessment thirty-five years 
later, will not regret that he did not exert a greater influence on American 
foreign policy in the Munich era. 
Nearly fifteen years passed between the appearance of the Foreign Rela- 
tions documents on the Munich crisis and the pubIication by the Roosevelt 
Library, in April 1969, of a three-volume compilation, Franklin D. Roose- 
velt and Foreign Affairs 1933-1937, an official U.S. government publication 
prepared by Edgar B. Nixon, former Assistant Director of the Library. 
This is not the place to discuss the background of these volumes, the 
propriety of their publication by a private university press, the unsuccessful 
attempt of that press (with the connivance of the government) to obtain an 
illegal copyright on these volumes, the systematic concealment of that 
compilation during most of the decade it was in preparation, or, as already 
noted,"' the deliberate concealment and withholding of some of the most 
interesting and important documents in this compilation from scholars 
who wished to use them for their own work.'96 Whatever one's judgment 
on these aspects of the Nixon volumes, or on their editorial design and 
adequacy, they are bound to add considerably to our knowledge and un- 
derstanding of Roosevelt's approach to foreign affairs during the Munich 
era. On the other hand, separate publication in November 1972 of the 
correspondence of Roosevelt and Bullitt revealed that the Nixon volumes 
had omitted a number of important letters, raising anew the question of 
the usefulness and completeness of Nixon's work. 
In his introduction to the recently published Roosevelt-Bullitt correspon- 
dence, George F. Kennan has suggested that the President was not a great 
letter writer and has gone on to draw certain larger conclusions from the 
nature of Roosevelt's exchanges with Bullitt. 
It was no doubt [Kennan writes] the part of wisdom In the President not to reveal his 
thoughts in letters whlch were, for the most part, dispatched abroad and might easily ftnd 
their way, by the vicissitudes of politics and war, into the wrong hands. His responsibrlity, 
after all, was greater than that of his Ambassador. Sttll, such 1s the level of tnvlaltty in these 
brief Presidential notes-the superficiality, the forced and often unsuccessful humor, the 
studied avoidance of every serious subject-that they do not reflect very happily on the 
qualities of the author.lg7 
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There is little doubt that Roosevelt's letters to Bullitt do, indeed, "not reflect 
very happily on the qualities of the author," although it should be added that 
it has been known, at least since the publication of FDR-His Personal 
Letters 1928-1945, that Roosevelt's correspondence-with the sole exception 
perhaps of his wartime correspondence with Winston Churchilll98 -lacked 
the intellectual and stylistic distinction for instance of the letters of his 
famous cousin TR.Ig9 On the other hand, the Nixon volumes do, on the 
whole, especially when taken together with the previously published Foreign 
Relations documents, give us a remarkably good idea of Roosevelt's ap- 
proach to foreign affairs during the Munich era, or more accurately perhaps, 
his lack of an approach. 
The Nixon volumes, moreover, are important for two other reasons. In the 
first place, they allow us to understand better than we have previously been 
able to do something of the personal and political factors and pressures that 
influenced Roosevelt during his first term in office. If Roosevelt, for in- 
stance, never publicly attacked the pillars of isolationist history and foreign 
policy, it is interesting to observe that he was equally cautious and circum- 
spect in his private correspondence with Oswald Garrison Villard and other 
leading isolationists and pacifists.2* In the second place, it has long been 
known that Secretary Hull (and Under Secretary R. Walton Moore) passed 
on to Roosevelt from time to time some of the important telegrams that came 
into the State Department from abroad, but it has hitherto been difficult to 
judge which of these messages Roosevelt actually read and how he re- 
sponded to them. It has also been known for some time that Roosevelt 
carried on an extended personal correspondence with some of his leading 
ambassadors, including Claude Bowers, William Bullitt, Josephus Daniels,2o' 
and William E. Dodd. The Nixon volumes now allow us to read a substantial 
portion of that correspondence during Roosevelt's first term. They allow us 
to read what Roosevelt read and how he responded. Whatever the question- 
able background and editorial shortcomings of the Nixon volumes, that is 
a significant contribution to recent American history. 
It will come as no surprise perhaps that some of the letters addressed to 
the President were inaccurate, superficial, and misleading, an early example 
of such a communication being for instance the endorsement of Hitler's 
rearmament program by Breckenridge Long, the American ambassador to 
Italy, in December 1933, about whose egregious political misjudgments more 
will be said later:202 
Some [German] rearmament is necessary to satisfy her nafional self-respect. The non- 
aggression pacts will lend substance to her professrons of peaceful intent. And the program 
offers a practical solution for the impasse in Europe. . . . If France and her allies continue 
opposition-the show is over. Germany will arm anyway. There will be no supervision and 
no agreement of any kind. France cannot attack. It is too late.. . . It would be a difficult 
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task indeed to penetrate Germany, even on the pretext of preventing armament. So, while 
the German proposals may look like a program for armament, it is the best Europe can 
produce today. It seems the only practical step to get somewhere on the road to armament 
reduction during the next ten years.203 
Following a visit to various European capitals, including Berlin, John 
Cudahy, the American ambassador in Poland, reported to Roosevelt at the 
end of December 1933 that he had embarked on that tour 
with a prejudice that Germany was engaged in large-scale preparations threatening the 
peace of Europe. This prejudice was entirely dissipated after my vlsit to that country.. . . 
This does not gainsay the fact that the country is being organized on a miIitary basis. . . . 
This appears menacing unless one is on the ground to realize that there is nothing essen- 
tially belligerent or alarming about these activities. They are really only a manifestation of 
Germany affording an outlet for the peculiar social need of the country which loves display 
and pageantry. . . . The German feels important and distinguished in a uniform and what 
has been taken for a blatant display of militarism is merely an expansion of the unique 
German gregarious instinct, accountable on the same grounds that Elks, Eagles, Woodmen, 
etc. are accountable. 
Cudahy took note of Hitler's declared ambition to achieve by political 
methods the annexation of Austria, but he discounted the significance of 
such a move on the ground that "dismembered Austria has a population of 
only 6 million and no capital resources for war. The Anschluss should 
weaken rather than strengthen Germany's position in E u r ~ p e . " ~ ~  
It may be interjected at this point that Cudahy's last assertion was in a 
class with the judgment of Grenville T. Emmet, the American minister to 
Holland, who on February 26, 1936, informed Roosevelt that "I think one 
of the things for which one must give Hitler credit (and there are not many 
in that category) is that he has perceptibly eased the anti-French feeling in 
Germany. . . . My feeling is that Hitler really has not at the moment deep 
designs against the French. He is more concerned with what Russia and 
Poland are doing and also Czecho~lovakia";~~~ or the report of Anthony J. 
Drexel Biddle, the American minister to Norway, who at the close of a long 
tour d'horizon from London written two days earlier, had reported to Roose- 
velt that "as regards the British political picture, it is expected here that Mr. 
Winston Churchill will eventually replace Mr. B a l d ~ i n , " ~ ~ ~  or Biddle's equal- 
ly correct assertion, on March 18, 1936: "I am led to believe that we are 
about to enter upon an era where we may watch for vast peace proposals 
on the part of Great Britain. . . . The definitive objective of this course is to 
bring about a 'New Deal' in Europe in which Germany must have a part. 
There must be security for Belgium and France and equality and security 
for Germany."207 
Roosevelt, who did not invariably reply to or even acknowledge all com- 
munications from his ambassadors and ministers, and whose reaction to 
their reports is therefore not always clear, responded to Cudahy on January 
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8, 1934, thanking him for his "most interesting letter," but expressing some 
doubts about Cudahy's optimistic survey: "I do hope you are right in what 
you say of preparations in Germany. The chief problem is, of course, wheth- 
er the marching of the general spirit of things is heading consciously or 
sub-consciously toward an idea of extension of boundaries."208 
Roosevelt did not have long to wait before increasingly gloomy analyses 
of the European political situation began to reach his desk. In late March 
1934, J. V. A. MacMurray, the American minister to Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, reported on the development of a surreptitious Nazi movement 
in those Baltic countries.209 A month later, Robert Bingham, the publisher 
of the Louisville Courier Journal whom Roosevelt had appointed ambassa- 
dor to Great Britain, reported from London that "the British are deeply 
concerned over the situation, both in Europe and in the Far East. They 
realize they are in no position to repel an attack from the air. They believe 
all hope for disarmament is gone, and I am convinced that all thoughtful 
people here believe that the only hope for peace in the world lies in coopera- 
tion between the British and ourselves, and that they eagerly desire it."210 By 
mid-July 1934, John F. Montgomery, the American minister to Hungary, 
saw the deepening totalitarian shadows over the Balkans and the rest of 
Europe: 
Poss~bly the situation will become so bad that the great European Powers will be forced 
to agree on a common program to save themselves. Nothing, however, that has happened 
in the past could encourage anyone to believe they w~ll; everything has been done too late. 
If France had granted Briining one half of what she has been willing to give Hitler, there 
would have been no Hitler. Europe never seems to realize that it is all tied up in one sack, 
and that it must be saved as a whole if the individual States are to save themselves?" 
By the close of 1934,moreover, the Far Eastern situation and its relation to 
the troubled European picture were becoming of increasing concern to Roo- 
sevelt. Indeed as early as April of that year Roosevelt had received a copy 
of a long memorandum prepared by Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State and probably its 
outstanding expert on that part of the world. The memorandum numbered 
more than sixteen printed pages and discussed the rapidly gathering storm 
in the Far East. Responding to a recent "personal suggestion" by the Jap- 
anese ambassador to the United States that the two countries issue "a joint 
declaration that each reposed full confidence in the sincerity of the other's 
motives," Hornbeck declared himself strongly opposed to any such state- 
ment: 
From beginning to end [he wrote], we should keep in mind the thought that the ultimate 
objective of the Japanese is to promote and facilitate the attainment by Japan of a para- 
mount and discriminating position in the Far East and that their immediate objective is 
to discover what is our present attitude and probable future attitude and intent. 
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Hornbeck had no doubt as to what lay behind Japan's innocuous-looking 
approach: 
What the Japanese especially desire at  the present moment is relief from any apprehension 
of possible action of restraint or coercion (sooner or later) by or from the United States 
and/or Great Britain. If Japan could be sure that the United States and Great Brttain 
would stand completely aslde, Japan could (and probably woufd) rapidly proceed with new 
steps in a program intended ultimately to establish Japan's authority not only inManchuria 
and Mongolia but in certain portions of China and Siberia. 
As Hornbeck saw it, the Japanese proposed to accomplish this objective 
in two ways-first in the realm of power. 
In their approach to any of the so-called "problems" or "issues" in relations between Japan 
and the United States, Japan's spokesmen make it a point to rely heavlly upon the fact that 
the Amencan Government and peopIe are imbued with a certain emotional idealism and 
are enamored of certain idealistic concepts with regard to international relations. They 
endeavour to induce the American Government to make to the Japanese Government real 
concessions desired by Japan, in connection with Japan's Asia policy, in return for nominal 
adherence by Japan to idealistic objectives to which the United States is committed in 
connection with world problems. Regularly, the Japanese ask for concessions in fact by 
this country as the price of concessions in principle (or to principle) by ~a~an . ' ' '  
It is not known what Roosevelt thought of Hornbeck's important memo- 
randum, which reached him by way of Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of 
StateWilliamPhillips. Beforetheyear was out, on December 14,1934, Norman 
H. Davis, then chairman of the American delegation to the London naval 
conference, wrote at length about the growing crisis in the Pacific stemming 
from Japan's decision to denounce the Washington treaty and about British 
uneasiness concerning American policy in the Far East. 
I have been proceeding on the theory [Davis wrote] that it was our policy, and in out 
interest, to maintain an Anglo-American front as the best means of avo~ding trouble with 
Japan or of minimizing it tf it could not be avoided. [The British] have an inordinate fear 
that if the tactics we propose so estrange Japan as to lead to ultimate trouble, we may not 
be with them when the trouble comes. For instance, they Intimate that under American 
pressure the League adopted our views with regard to Manchuria, which forced Japan out 
of the League; and that, since the action thus taken was not folIowed by cooperative steps 
looking to a solution, the situation has become increasingly a source of trouble and 
embarrassment; and that our active interest in promoting a policy of non-recognition and 
moral condemnation was followed by a policy of more or less withdrawaI from the Far 
East, including the ultimate withdrawal from the ~ h i l i ~ ~ i n e s . ~ ' ~  
By the time Roosevelt received Davis's letter, other foreign problems, or 
problems related to foreign affairs, had begun to claim his attention. First, 
there was the brief, unsuccessful struggle to secure Senate approval of Ameri- 
can membership in the World Court; second, there was the approach of the 
Italo-Ethiopian war, which was in the making throughout the spring and 
summer of 1935 and finally broke out in October of that year.214 
As regards American membership in the World Court, which had been 
discussed for many years but never formally acted upon by the United States 
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Senate, it does not seem likely that Senate concurrence would have substan- 
tially changed the course of international affairs at that time. The fact that 
the Senate-in which Democrats outnumbered Republicans 69 to 25-de- 
clined by a vote of 52 to 36 (seven votes short of the required two-thirds 
majority) to ratify American membership could by no means be ascribed 
solely to the last-minute propaganda campaign mounted by the Hearst news- 
papers and other anti-Court elements.215 It seems likely that the Senate's 
action was in part at least the result of uncertainty about, and disaffection 
with, Roosevelt's foreign policy. As Senator Key Pittman, the Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, put it frankly to the President on  
February 19: 
No one today knows what is the foreign policy of our Government. Are we going to 
participate in European affairs, or are we going to keep out of them? Are we going to 
enforce treaties, or are we golng to abandon them?216 
It seems unlikeIy that the defeat of American membership in the World 
Court exerted any significant effect upon Mussolini's well-advanced plans 
to take over Ethiopia, but the Senate's repudiation of Roosevelt's ineffective 
leadership could scarcely have discouraged the Italian dictator from pro- 
ceeding with his long intended African adventure. In this connection, it must 
be observed that while the United States had the benefit of an outstandingly 
able and conscientious diplomat in Addis Ababa, Cornelius Engert, the 
American Minister Resident, who reported regularly and at length about 
Italian designs on the country to which he was accredited,2I7 Roosevelt's 
ambassador in Rome had no such evident interest. On the contrary, after 
first adopting a highly sanguine view of German rearmament, his main 
concern suddenly shifted to Hitler's next moves, apparently forgetting all 
about Mussolini's in the process. 
[The Italians] all feel [Long reported to Roosevelt on February 8, 1935) that the Saar 
plebiscite has acted as a big drink of Schnapps to the Germans and that Hitler will be 
emboldened now to pursue h ~ s  Pan Germanlc ideas into the fields of former German 
territorles and Austr~a. They are convinced that Germany is very well equipped for war 
but not yet prepared to take the offensive or to commit an act whlch might lead immedlate- 
ly to open 
Nine paragraphs later Long finally got around to the subject of Abyssinia, 
and he left no doubt that he had no stomach for a determined stand against 
Mussolini's intended depredations: 
. . .there have been Ethiopian aggressions against the French which have been well adver- 
tlsed In the European press . . . also . . . the Itallan papers state that the Amerlcan 
Minister- or Chargi d' Affaires - has been subjected to some mistreatment and indignity. 
. . . The League of Nations is apparently not to take up the subject but has referred it back 
for settIement between Italy and Abyssinia. So that our absence from membership In the 
League would not serve as a predicate. There would remain only our interest in universal 
peace-but it does seem a long way outslde our b a i l ~ w ~ c k . ~ ' ~  
56 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
If the President disagreed with Long's fundamental assessment of the 
situation there is no evidence of it in the Nixon volumes. On March 9 
Roosevelt responded to Long 
Those letters of yours are extraordinarily interesting even though they are pessimistic in 
tone. I fear I must agree with you about the general situation. 
These are without doubt the most hair-trigger times the world has gone through in your 
lifetime or mine. I do not even exclude June and July, 1914 because at that time there was 
economic and social stability. 
Keep on writing to me?20 
There can be little doubt about the general correctness of the President's 
assessment of the prevailing world situation. The day before he wrote to 
Long-and Roosevelt's letter may well have been a reflection of the news- 
Hitler had announced the establishment of a new German air force, and he 
followed this on March 15 by informing the world that Germany would no 
longer be bound by any military provisions of the treaty of Versailles and 
would immediately increase the size of the German army from 100,000 to 
500,000 men.Z2' The handwriting was now on the wall in Europe, but it seems 
apparent that its meaning was not clearly understood by most of Roosevelt's 
ambassadors. It was apparent that Britain and France were no longer suffi- 
ciently strong to deter German treaty violations. If ever there was a time for 
increasingly close cooperation between the western democracies that time 
was 1935. 
This was not, however, the way that men like Robert Bingham in London 
and William Bullitt in Moscow viewed the situation. "In the last analysis," 
Bingham confided to Roosevelt on March 26, "peace depends on economic 
security." 
I am more than doubtful [he continued] whether we could keep out of a great European 
conflagration. We tried that once before, with no success. Therefore the question arises as 
to what we can do in our own interest to aid an appeasement in Central Europe. Certainly 
our contribution is not that special form of "moral leadership" which was the easy answer 
of the previous Administration to every difficult problem. The practical substantial benefit 
which we can confer lies in the progress we make in the United States toward economic 
recovery. May I repeat my belief that the possibility of war is inextricably joined to world 
economic recovery and that the greatest contnbution the United States can make, indeed 
perhaps the only one, would be the confidence and benefit the world would obtain from 
a decided economic upturn in North ~ m e r i c a ? ' ~  
An even more stronglyworded plea for the United States to keep out of the 
growing imbroglio abroad came on April 8 from Bullitt, then visiting Paris. 
It seems worth recaIling that, of all American diplomats in Europe, none had 
better sources of information than did Bullitt, none had fewer illusions about 
the declining strength of Britain and-especially-of France, and yet--as a 
deeply disillusioned Wilsonian-none pleaded more frequently with Roose- 
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velt to keep the United States out of the conflict he was sure lay ahead. 
It is obvious, of course [Bullitt told Roosevelt] . . . that no one in Europe is any longer 
thinking of peace but that everyone is thinking furiously about obtaining as many allies 
as possible for the next war. As each day passes I become more convinced that our only 
sane policy is to stay just as far as possible outside the mess?23 
If Bullitt feared anything more than a Nazi triumph it was the spread of 
Russian Communism, toward which he had once-especially during the 
early years of the Russian revolution-been rather sympathetic,224 but which 
upon closer acquaintance he had come to loathe and dread. After his return 
to Moscow, Bullitt remarked to Roosevelt on May Day 1935: 
The terror, always present, has risen to such a pitch that the least of the Moscowvites, as 
well as the greatest is in fear. 
. . . Do you remember our bet of one red apple or whatever (I have forgotten what) as 
to the scene of the first outbreak of war? You picked Europe and I picked the Far East. 
I am beginning to be inclined to think that you will probably turn out to be nght as usual. 
. . . The long range outlook everywhere is about as bad as can be and the worst of it is 
that we can do nothing whatever to stop the march of events.. . . I see no way that we 
can achieve anything by attempting to stop the march of events-hornble as it is-except 
our own involvement in war and I hope you will turn a very deaf ear to the songs of the 
sirens who must be keeping you awake nights with their music. I saw that Stimson had 
donned the mermaid's tail and there must be a thousand others whose hearts are better 
than their heads?25 
Bullitt's counsel did not fall on entirely unsympathetic ears. In the summer 
of 1935, with the Presidential election only a year away, Roosevelt was in 
no mood to become deeply involved in foreign affairs. Perhaps because of 
the continuing isolationist feeling at home, perhaps because of his concern 
over the recently signed Anglo-German naval agreement, and perhaps also 
because of that slight touch of Anglophobia from which he was never entire- 
ly free, Roosevelt poured out his personal feelings in a rarely revelatory 
fashion to Ambassador Bingham in London on July 11: 
[The British] are beginning to realize that a greater friendliness to us would not hurt them. 
Many years ago I came to the reluctant conclusion that it is a mistake to make advances 
to the Bntish Government; practical results can be accomplished only when they make the 
advances themselves. They are a funny people and, though always polite, can be counted 
on when things are going well with them to show a national selfishness towards other 
nations which makes mutual helpfulness very difficult to accomplish. Their average con- 
ception of mutuality differs from mine.226 
Roosevelt, it appears, was deeply concerned about the new Anglo-German 
naval agreement, which the British had secretly negotiated behind the back 
of France,227 an agreement which allowed the Germans-in violation of the 
treaty of Versailles-to build a navy thirty-five per cent as large as that of 
Great Britain, as well as an unlimited number of submarines.228 
I fear me [the President went on to say] that the British have, in the German Naval 
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Agreement, let themselves in for real resentment on the Continent, and also for much 
trouble to themselves in the days to come. I cannot forget that Germany's new Naval 
program, just announced, shows a number of submannes and other ships practically 
completed. In other words, Germany began to vlolate the Treaty obl~gations from two to 
three years ago. What is to prevent Germany from violating this new agreement and calmly 
announcing the violat~on after she has doubled her new allowance of submannes, cruisers, 
etc.? 
Roosevelt, it seems clear, was also suspicious, mistakenly as it turned out, 
that there was more to the Anglo-German naval agreement than had been 
publicly announced, but while he was struggling with the Congress over 
neutrality legislation, he was not about to allow the country to become 
involved in additional international complications. 
Most highly confidential [Roosevelt concIuded]-wtll you try to keep your ear open for any 
suggestions that England and Germany have agreed on certain other important points not 
connected with or included in the naval announcement? A very wise old bird tells me that 
a number of important world forces, Including the Brit~sh, would much like to involve us 
In some way-any way-in the world's cr~tical problems. 
This is not the appropriate place to review at length the long and acrimonious 
debates over neutrality legislation that preoccupied the Congress during 
much of 1935, or the debates over the revision and extension of this legisla- 
tion in 1936.229 However, to judge by the materials included in the Nixon 
volumes, Roosevelt made little or no effort to check the isolationist forces 
solidly in command of Capitol Hill, any more than (as already indicated by 
Secretary he took a determined stand to curb the investigative abuses 
of the Nye C0mrnittee,2~' whose highly publicized attacks on the financial 
community, especially the house of Morgan, may in fact have suited his 
political purposes. Indeed, when the neutrality legislation finally reached 
Roosevelt, he had little complaint about it. "It is," he told a press conference 
on August 28, 1935, "entirely satisfactory, except that it does not include any 
power over loans for financing. . . . The question of embargoes against two 
belligerents meets the need of the existing situation. What more can one ask? 
And, by the time the situation changes, Congress will be back with us, so we 
are all right."232 
Similarly, when Roosevelt, on February 29, 1936, signed the House Joint 
Resolution extending the neutrality legislation enacted the previous summer, 
he had nothing but kind words about the latest Congressional handiwork. 
"By the Resolution approved August 3 1, 1935," Roosevelt said in a prepared 
statement, "a definite step was taken towards enabling this country to main- 
tain its neutrality and avoid being drawn into wars invoIving other nations. 
. . . By the Resolution I have just signed the operation of the August Reso- 
lution is extended and strengthened until May 1, 1937."233 
If Roosevelt believed that the enactment of new American neutrality 
legislation was a harbinger of a period of increased international harmony 
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and cooperation, he was soon to be disabused of such unfounded optimism. 
His invocation of the original neutrality act had done nothing to stop Italian 
aggression against Ethiopia. Roosevelt did himself no credit by proudly 
proclaiming, as he did at a press conference in June 1936, that the United 
States had been the first to recognize that a state of belligerency existed234 
between Italy and Ethiopia, thus-although Roosevelt was careful to omit 
any suggestion of this-making it impossible for the victims of Italian aggres- 
sion to attempt to procure arms to defend themselves. On the other hand, 
oil shipments to Italy which Mussolini needed to carry on his war were not 
cut off.235 
The Italo-Ethiopian war, which at first seemed so far removed from the 
mainstream of world politics, was a foretaste of the international law1essness 
which was soon to rise in a steady crescendo. Of this, the German remilitari- 
zation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, and the outbreak of the Spanish 
Civil War in July of that year, were additional ominous examples. 
Roosevelt's response to the German move into the Rhineland, or rather 
his lack of response, has already been discussed at some le11gth.~~6 It is 
interesting that the Nixon volumes add little to the story as revealed by the 
Foreign Relations documents published in 1953. If Jesse Isidor Straus, the 
American ambassador in Paris, had any inkling of what was afoot and 
accordingly informed Roosevelt, there is no evidence of it in the Nixon 
volumes, This is not to say that Roosevelt was not being kept informed 
concerning the significance of the German coup. The first to discuss the 
importance of the German stroke appears to have been John Cudahy, the 
American ambassador to Poland, usually considered one of Roosevelt's 
most "non-interventionist" diplomats, who on March 20 commented to the 
President: 
The past week has demonstrated very clearly that [the common working-day sense base 
of security] has crashed in European international affairs and that the League of Nations 
and collective security are all ~llusory. Only a a r a c l e  can preclude war In Europe.. . . The 
catastrophe may be averted for a time but if Hitler is not overthrown a war in Europe is 
as certain as the nsing sun. It may be a matter of a year, two years, five years. But that 
another contest with Germany is coming is universally conceded now even by the most 
con~ervative.~~' 
The word from Berlin was no more encouraging. On April 1 Ambassador 
Dodd concluded: 
. . . Germany's dictatorship is now stronger than ever. If she keeps the peace three more 
years she can beat the whole of Europe in a war., . . If Woodrow Wilson's bones do not 
turn in the Cathedral grave, then bones never turn in graves. Possibly you can do some- 
thing, but from reports of Congressional attitudes I have grave doubts. So many men, 
including my friend [Charles A.] Beard, think absolute isolation a coming paradise.238 
Roosevelt, perhaps sensing the correctness of these observations, as well as 
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the difficulty if not undesirability of attempting to respond to the German 
stroke in some effective fashion in an election year, was not inclined to 
become involved in long exchanges concerning this latest European disaster. 
Dodd's letter, therefore, went unanswered, and to Cudahy Roosevelt replied, 
in a perfunctory note, on April 15, "I am delighted to find yours of March 
twentieth on my return from a two weeks cruise in the Bahamas. The excite- 
ment seems still to continue throughout Europe, and the situation changes 
from day to day."239 
No sooner had the shock waves from the Rhineland crisis begun to fade 
than hostilities broke out in Spain. A substantial number of books have by 
now been written on that and the policy of the United States 
toward that tragic conflict has, as already noted, likewise been discussed at 
some length.241 Although the Foreign Relations documents on this subject 
showed at great length how well Claude G. Bowers, the American ambassa- 
dor to Spain, had kept his government informed, the Nixon volumes added 
a significant dimension to what was previously known in this regard.242 
"There is," Bowers informed Roosevelt on August 6, "no possible justifi- 
cation for the rebellion in anything done by the legal, legitimate Govern- 
ment, voted in overwhelmingly a few months ago." Moreover, from the first 
days of the conflict, Bowers had no doubt that far more was involved here 
than a purely domestic struggle. 
The possibilities of this crisis precipitating a European war are really grave. Germany and 
Italy have been openly, brazenly, against the Government. . . . France and the French 
Ambassador are as openly with the Government and against the rebels. I have found the 
dipIomatic corps generally with the rebels. . . . They are constantly seeking an opportunity 
. . . to deal a blow to the ~ o v e r n m e n t . ~ ~ ~  
Nevertheless, in spite of his unswerving loyalty to the Republican Govern- 
ment, Bowers was far from urging American intervention on the President. 
"When one reflects," he commented to Roosevelt on September 16, "on the 
possibility that European Governments may determine policies on this very 
elemental conflict on the advice of such men [as the foreign diplomats in 
Spain] one wonders how old Europe can escape war, pestilence and famine 
long. By staying out we are protecting our neutrality in the best manner."244 
By late September the internationalization of the war was proceeding 
apace, but with the significant difference that Britain and France were 
faithfully observing their pledge of "non-intervention" and the pro-rebel 
powers were not. On September 23 Bowers wrote Roosevelt from Saint-Jean- 
de-Luz in southern France: 
For some weeks now there has been nothing to indicate that France is not rigidly enforcing 
its neutrality. There is every indication that the fascist Powers are violating their pledge 
and furnishing arms, ammunition and men. More and more the controversy here is taking 
the form of an international conspiracy to destroy the democracy of Spain under the 
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pretext of saving it from Communism. This is being carried forward quite openly and with 
true fascist arrogance. I am informed by Knickerbocker of the Hearst press, John Whitaker 
of the New York Herald-Tribune, and Floyd Gibbons, who recently returned from a survey 
of the military situation in the south, that when in Seville they saw night after night in a 
cafe, German aviators who are accompanied by German mechanicians, They admit they 
are not giving this important news to the public, and explain their silence by saying that 
the publication of this fact would result in their expulsion, if not their arrest. They tell me 
that the rebels are using German bombing planes and Italian pursuit planes. 
Even so, now that German and Italian intervention in Spain was virtually 
out in the open, Bowers maintained that the United States should keep hands 
off. "I think," he concluded, "we should continue our present policy without 
deviation. This is a serious European quarrel in which we have no proper 
part."245 Although Bowers became increasingly critical of the non-interven- 
tion policy as time went on (it is, he was writing by the end of October, 
"nothing more than a device conceived by France to excuse herself from 
selling arms to the legal G o ~ e r n m e n t " ~ ~ ~ )  there is no evidence to suggest that 
Bowers changed his mind concerning what the United States should do 
about the conflict, and none that Roosevelt--despite all the domestic contro- 
versy that continued to surround the subject--ever changed his mind about 
it either.247 
By the end of the summer the United States was preoccupied with the 
presidential election campaign. Not surprisingly, Roosevelt, as already sug- 
gested, sought. to minimize the importance of foreign affairs and possible 
American involvement in another international conflict. As already noted 
also, he devoted only a single address, that at Chautauqua, to the subject of 
foreign policy, summing up his own position on that occasion in effect: "I 
have seen war . . . I hate 
This is not to say, however, that privately Roosevelt did not continue to 
be concerned with the darkening world situation. Certainly there was noth- 
ing in his correspondence with his ambassadors in Europe that would have 
encouraged him to adopt even a modestly hopeful outlook. As early as 
February, William C. Bullitt, following a visit to London, Paris, Brussels, 
Berlin, and Warsaw had sent the President the first of a long series of gloomy 
forecasts about Hitler and the future of Czechoslovakia. "There is a rising 
wave of feeling [in Paris] that France should not go to war with Germany 
to save Czechoslovakia. . . . Needless to say, all the way from London to 
Moscow the chief topic was the dangerous situation of Czechoslovakia. The 
Czechoslovak position is made somewhat desperate by the fact that nobody 
in Europe likes the Czechs, to say nothing of Czechesses, whose piano legs 
and aversion to soap are notorious from one end of the continent to the 
other."249 In late November, by which time he had succeeded Jesse Straus 
as American ambassador to France, Bullitt returned to the subject: 
Czechoslovakia is clearly the next item on Hitler's menu. 
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If Hitler should send forces into Czechoslovakia the position of France, as well as of 
Czechoslovakia, would become tragic. (No military man with whom I have talked 
believes that the Soviet alr force can bring any effective aid to Czechoslovakia.) The 
French would have to decide whether or not to carry out the obligations of their treaty 
of alliance with Czechoslovakia. 
The Quai d'Orsay would be all for carrying out these obligations but I am inclined 
to believe that the greater part of the country would be dead agarnst carrying them 
out. 
The Belgian Ambassador here is an able man of long experience. He said to me a 
few days ago that it was certain France would not march in support of Czechoslovakia. 
He predicted that France would first ask Belgium and England what they would do. 
He said he was certain both his own country and England would refuse to do 
anything; that the French would then be faced with the problem of attacking Ger- 
many, unsupported, or allowing CzechosIovakia to be swallowed and denying their 
pledged word. He added he was certain the French, under the circumstances, would 
not march.250 
To this remarkably prophetic message Roosevelt made no response. Al- 
though by this time he had scored one of the greatest electoral victories 
in modern American history, the President seemed disinclined to change 
the course of American foreign policy, any more than he had been 
willing earlier in the year (when it was clear to nearly all close observers 
of the political scene that he was going to win an overwhelming victory) 
to try to educate his country about the rapidly deteriorating world situ- 
ation. 
There is no question that, while on the one hand the kind of post- 
Wilsonian collective security espoused by farsighted men like Henry L. 
Stimson enjoyed little or no public support, Roosevelt continued to be 
the target of widespread and well-organized efforts by self-styled "peace 
groups" aiming to keep the President on a firmly isolationist course. The 
history of these groups in the 1930's, and of Roosevelt's response to their 
efforts, is still to be but it may be observed that Roosevelt's 
response to these elements and their-political propaganda was remarkably 
passive and ineffective, especially when compared with the vigorous fash- 
ion in which Roosevelt invariably confronted and attacked the critics of 
his domestic policies. 
This is not to suggest that Roosevelt was not disturbed-indeed some- 
times affronted-by the historical distortion of these "peace groups." It 
seems evident that from time to time Roosevelt became thoroughly fed 
up with some of the more outlandish isolationist claims and reinterpreta- 
tions of recent American history. As Roosevelt put it to Colonel House 
in September 1935: 
You may be interested to know that some of the Congressmen and Senators who are 
suggesting wild-eyed measures to keep us out of war are now declaring that you and 
[Robert] Lansing and [Walter Hines] Page forced Wilson into the war! I had a talk 
with them, explained that I was in Washington myself the whole of that period, that 
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none of them was there and that their historical analysis was totally inaccurate and 
that history yet to be written would prove my point. The trouble is that they belong to the 
very large and perhaps increasing school of thought which holds that we can and should 
withdraw wholly within ourselves and cut off all but the most perfunctory relationships 
with other nations. They imagine that if the civilization of Europe is about to destroy itself 
through internal strife, it might just as well go ahead and do it and that the United States 
can stand idly by.252 
In public, however, Roosevelt was considerably more circumspect. He con- 
tinued to hold meetings with such representative organizations as the Na- 
tional Peace Conference. After their meeting at the White House, the presi- 
dent of that association informed Roosevelt that "we were very pleased to 
learn from you that the administration had repudiated the speech of Senator 
Pittman in which provocative references were made to Japan." He added 
that the members of his delegation-which included not only strong pacifists 
like Dorothy Detzer of the Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom, but more moderate men like William Stone of the Foreign Policy 
Association and Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University, a 
member of the House Inquiry who had accompanied President Wilson to 
Europe on the S.S. Washington-"were still not convinced that huge military 
and naval expenditures were necessary for defense purposes."253 Roosevelt 
also met with representatives of the People's Mandate to Governments to 
End War Committee, headed by its president, Mary E. Woolley of Mount 
Holyoke College, one of his more frequent correspondents. Receiving them 
at Hyde Park after returning from a Sunday church service, he "endorsed 
their objective to secure 50 million signatures throughout the world to a 
petition to all governments to renounce war and reduce armaments."254 
Nor did Roosevelt take a stronger stand in personal correspondence with 
some of his liberal supporters, who were urging on him much the same 
foreign policies as did various peace groups. J. David Stern, the publisher 
of the liberal New York Post wrote Roosevelt in late 1935 that he believed 
that "an overwhelming majority of Americans care more about keeping out 
of war than about any other one thing. If the average citizen suspects, 
rightfully or wrongfully, that your administration is backing up the League 
or Great Britain, it would cause a most unfortunate reaction." Roosevelt 
replied blandly that his own policy "neither had nor has the slightest connec- 
tion with League action or British action. . . . By checking the dates you will 
see that, as a matter of fact, we have preceded Great Britain and the League 
in every move made. Perhaps in January Congress will give me a little more 
power which I do not need to say will be exercised for the primary objective 
of keeping us out of this or any other 
Even more damaging-and unintentionally revealing-was an exchange 
between Roosevelt and Oswald Garrison Villard, the veteran editor of The 
Nation, whose bitter opposition to Woodrow Wilson and the Paris peace 
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settlement had led him to become one of the most determined and influential 
opponents of renewed American involvement in world affairs.256 Anticipat- 
ing by a generation the kind of misuse of history characteristic of New Left 
historians and "peace groups" in the Vietnam Villard and his fellow 
liberals-of whom Senator Nye and his associates were a good example- 
sought to persuade the country that Wilson had improperly and unneces- 
sarily dragged the United States into the world war and that a repetition of 
that experience must be avoided at all cost. If Roosevelt could be persuaded 
to accept that reading of recent American history and its contemporary 
implications, at least in some respects, a large part of their objective would 
have been won. 
It cannot be said that Roosevelt successfully parried the thrust of Villard's 
argument. After his Chautauqua speech, Villard wrote Roosevelt thanking 
him "from the bottom of my heart for your noble utterance . . . quite the 
finest peace speech that has been voiced by any man in high position," and 
went on to remark: 
When you say that "we can keep out of war ~f they (our offic~als) possess the courage to 
say 'no' to those who would selfishly or unwisely let us go to war," I think you prove my 
contention that Wllson could have kept us out of the war in 1917 had he had the backbone, 
the courage and the desire.258 
Villard's misreading of the circumstances leading to American entry into the 
first world warzs9 deserved something like Roosevelt7s unvarnished remarks 
to Colonel House in September 1935, quoted above.260 Unfortunately, and 
no doubt symptomatically, Roosevelt sought to strike a different note. Hav- 
ing been a member of the Wilson administration, and as Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy undoubtedly acquainted with the nature and significance of the 
German submarine menace and other reasons for American entry into the 
war, Roosevelt might have been expected to use this opportunity to correcT, 
firmly but politely, his old friend's historical misinterpretation, but he delib- 
erately chose not to do so. 
You are right in part about Wllson [Roosevelt replied]. The difflcuIty is that In those days 
most people were thinking in terms of the old lnternatlonal law which 1s now completely 
disappeared. From the point of view of hindsight, we might have kept out, but at the tlme 
we were following the precedent of several ~ e n t u r i e s . ~ ~ '  
Looking back on the election campaign of 1936 and its aftermath, it seems 
apparent that Roosevelt and his diplomats were, on the whole, agreed that 
the United States should do everything possible to stay out of the European 
conflict that to most of them seemed sure to come. If Roosevelt and his 
diplomats-with the conspicuous exception of William E. Dodd in Berlin- 
recognized that Britain and France were no longer in a position to defend 
themselves against the threat of totalitarian aggression, there is little evidence 
of it in the Nixon volumes. There is no evidence either that Roosevelt and 
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most of his ambassadors were familiar with Mein Kampf and other expres- 
sions of the Nazi program or that they drew the appropriate conclusions 
from such expressions. 
As late as December 1936, Bullitt-who in 1917-1919 had been equally 
oblivious to the international implications of Marxism-Lenini~m*~~ -ap- 
peared to believe that a "reconciliation" between France and Nazi Ger- 
many was a serious possibility. "I think it might be useful," he suggested 
to Roosevelt,"if when you see [AndrC] de Laboulaye and [Hans] Luther," 
the French and German ambassadors in Washington, "you should 
stress the idea that peace in Europe is purely a question of Franco- 
German rec~nci l ia t ion ."~~~ Meanwhile Robert Bingham, in London, cau- 
tioned Roosevelt against "rousing false hopes on this side of the 
A t l a n t i ~ ; " ~ ~ ~ a n d  John Cudahy, in Warsaw, agreeing that "the outstanding 
menace to peace, of course, is Hitler," advised Roosevelt that "any interven- 
tion without some specific remedy for the difficulties over here would not 
only be unavailing but would be a mistake from the viewpoint of American 
prestige. I do not know what to 
Probably neither did Roosevelt. For the time being, his main concerns 
remained his domestic program, including his proposed reorganization of 
the United States Supreme Court, on which he embarked early in the 
new and his efforts to keep out, as far as possible, of any 
involvement in the Spanish struggle, then the major international threat 
to peace. 
But Roosevelt seemed unable to avoid taking a position on the war in 
Spain. On December 29, 1936, Norman Thomas, the veteran Socialist 
leader, whose isolationist credentials were unchallenged, wrote Roosevelt 
pleading with him not to "make it impossible for the Spanish Govern- 
ment to buy any military supplies whatsoever in the United States." He 
reminded Roosevelt that the Socialist Party had long advocated "very 
drastic laws against supplying belligerent nations or prospective belliger- 
ents with the means of war." But Spain was a very different kind of war. 
"We plead for recognition of the possibly disastrous effect of your action 
in disarming the Spanish Government in the face of well armed and 
ruthless rebel armies."267 
Roosevelt, however, was unmoved by Thomas's appeal, and in late 
January 1937 responded in a letter prepared by Assistant Secretary of 
State R. Walton Moore, a legalistic advocate of existing policy: 
. . . the very circumstances which you set forth so  fully In your letter [Roosevelt 
Informed Thomas] must make ~t clear that the civil confllct in Spain lnvolves so many 
non-Spanish elements and has such w ~ d e  ~nternatlonal lmpl~cattons that a pohcy of 
attempting to d~scrimmate between the parties would be dangerous in the extreme. Not 
only would we, by permitt~ng unchecked the flow of arms to one party in the confllct, 
be involv~ng ourselves dlrectly in that European strife from which our people desire 
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so deeply to remain aloof, but we would be deliberately encouraging those nations 
which would be glad of this pretext to continue their assistance to one side or the other 
in Spain and aggravating those disagreements among the European nations which are a 
constant menace to the peace of the 
It is not difficult to imagine the dismay with which Norman Thomas read 
those lines. But remembering that letter, Thomas would probably not have 
been entirely surprised by Roosevelt's remark to Ambassador William Phil- 
lips in Rome, nearly three weeks after Munich, in October 1938: "I want you 
to know that I am not a bit upset over the final re~ult.""~ 
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